Mari, R v

In a prosecution for causing death by dangerous driving, evidence of a driver’s alcohol consumption may be relevant to whether the driving was dangerous even where the driver was below the prescribed alcohol limit. That limit determines a separate statutory offence. It does not determine whether alcohol could affect the driver’s reactions or capacity to drive carefully.

Where there is clear evidence of a particular and significant quantity of alcohol consumed, the jury may assess it with all the other circumstances. Expert evidence quantifying its effect is not essential. Speed alone is insufficient, but excessive speed may establish dangerous driving when considered with the character and conditions of the road and the manner of driving.

The appellant was convicted at Harrow Crown Court of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. His car collided with a vehicle turning from a side road. He admitted driving at 60 to 65 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour residential area and admitted having consumed two pints of lager and a glass of wine. It was agreed that his blood alcohol level would have been below the prescribed limit.

He appealed against conviction. He contended that the evidence of alcohol consumption should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial. His proposed no-case submission was effectively withdrawn. The central issue was whether the alcohol evidence was properly admitted when the appellant was below the prescribed limit.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction for causing death by dangerous driving was safe. The judge was entitled to admit the appellant’s admission that he had consumed two pints of lager and a glass of wine.

2. The prescribed alcohol limit serves the distinct statutory purpose of determining whether an alcohol-related driving offence has been committed. It does not conclusively determine whether alcohol consumed could affect a person’s reactions or ability to drive carefully. Alcohol consumption may therefore be a relevant circumstance in deciding whether driving was dangerous under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

3. R v Woodward [1995] 2 Cr App R 388 did not require exclusion. In that case there was no evidence of the amount consumed beyond the appellant being seen with a glass. Here the appellant gave clear evidence of a particular and significant quantity. The jury could assess that factual evidence with the agreed fact that he was probably below the prescribed limit. Expert evidence measuring the effect of the alcohol on his driving was unnecessary.

4. The case was also properly left to the jury. Speed alone was insufficient to establish dangerous driving, but the prosecution case was not confined to speed. It included very substantial excess speed, failure to give way at a mini-roundabout, a residential single-carriageway road, parked cars, and restricted visibility for traffic emerging from the side road.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2009] EWCA Crim 2677.
• Crown Court at Harrow — on 4 December 2008, convicted the appellant of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988; on 10 January 2009, imposed three years’ imprisonment and a five-year driving disqualification, continuing until an appropriate test was passed.