Lambert, R. v

[2009] EWCA Crim 2860

Case details

Case citations
[2009] EWCA Crim 2860
Court
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judgment date
15 October 2009
Judgment text

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Subjects
Criminal Blackmail Theft offences
Keywords
blackmail unwarranted demand demand with menaces section 21 Theft Act 1968 pretended victim threatened violence telephone calls criminal appeal
Outcome
appeal dismissed (permission granted)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For blackmail under section 21 of the Theft Act 1968, an unwarranted demand with menaces does not require the demander to be the threatened aggressor, to arrange the threatened violence, or to control whether it occurs. It is enough that the demand deliberately imposes pressure by causing the recipient to believe that violence will follow if money is not provided.

A demand need not use forceful or express language. An apparently gentle request may constitute a demand when its context conveys an obligation backed by menacing pressure. An innocent person who merely communicates another person's threat, without making an unwarranted demand, is in a different position.

Factual background

The applicant was convicted of blackmail at Southampton Crown Court in March 2009. The prosecution alleged that he telephoned a debtor's grandmother, impersonated her grandson, and falsely stated that he was tied up and that money was required. The jury found that the applicant made the calls.

He sought to appeal on the basis that no blackmail was committed because he had posed as the victim of threatened violence, rather than as the person who would inflict it or procure its infliction. The central issue was whether that device could amount to an unwarranted demand with menaces under section 21 of the Theft Act 1968.

Held

  1. Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeal against conviction was dismissed. The trial judge correctly left the case to the jury.

  2. Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968 requires an unwarranted demand with menaces, made with the stipulated gain or loss intention. A demand need not be expressed as a command, requirement or obligation. Its character depends on the circumstances. Even a superficially gentle request may convey sinister pressure. The court relied on R v Collister [1955] 39 Cr App R 100 as confirming that principle.

  3. The statutory offence does not require the demander to threaten action personally, to authorise action by others, or to have power to bring the threatened harm about. Section 21(2) makes immaterial whether the menaces concern action by the person making the demand. The relevant question is whether the offender has imposed pressure on the recipient by conveying that, unless money is provided, the apparent hostage will suffer violence.

  4. On the jury's findings, the impersonated hostage device made a clear and unjustified demand and imposed menacing pressure on the grandmother. The fact that the caller presented himself as the threatened victim did not remove the case from the statutory offence. R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 supported the description of menaces as pressures, but did not itself resolve the precise argument because that point had not been fully argued there.

  5. An innocent intermediary who simply reports that another person is under threat makes no unwarranted demand and therefore commits no blackmail on that basis. That distinction did not assist a person who fabricated the threat in order to obtain money.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Granted permission to appeal and dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2009] EWCA Crim 2860.

  • Southampton Crown Court Convicted the applicant of blackmail in March 2009.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal dismissed (permission granted)

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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