Burdett & Anor, R. v

A true and fair account of the underlying criminality may properly be admitted where its omission would mislead the jury and the evidence is material to an issue they must decide. Its prejudicial effect does not itself make the trial unfair.

Where a police officer sits as a juror, the court must assess both the importance of any challenged police evidence and the possibility of bias arising from a connection between the juror and the witness. A remote connection and an immaterial evidential dispute will not ordinarily undermine the safety of the conviction.

A summing-up must be read as a whole. A judge may identify evidence probative of guilt if the defence case is also fairly presented. Sentence for money laundering must reflect the proved knowledge, benefit, delay and other mitigation.

Following a second retrial at Hull Crown Court, the appellants were convicted of entering into or being concerned in a money-laundering arrangement contrary to section 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Each received three years’ imprisonment.

They had paid into bank accounts cheques obtained by fraudsters who sold household equipment and service contracts to elderly victims at grossly inflated prices. The prosecution alleged that the appellants deliberately failed to inquire into the criminal source of the funds. Neither was linked by direct evidence to knowledge of the underlying fraud.

The appeals challenged the admission of evidence describing the victims as elderly and vulnerable, the presence of a police officer on the jury while another officer gave evidence, and the fairness of the Recorder’s summing-up. They also challenged the length of the sentences.

1. The appeals against conviction were dismissed. The admissions describing the complainants as elderly and vulnerable were properly before the jury. They gave a true and fair account of the underlying fraud, and withholding them would have been misleading. The evidence was also relevant to whether the person said to have persuaded the appellants could have persuaded them as alleged. Its admission created no unfairness for the purposes of section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.

2. The police juror ground failed on the principles clarified in R v Abdroikov [2007] UKHL 37 and formulated in R v Khan [2008] EWCA Crim. 531. The relevant questions were the importance of any challenged police evidence and the possibility of bias arising from the connection between the juror and the witness. The juror and witness belonged to different forces and had no conceivable connection. The disputed point in the witness’s evidence was a small part of Smith’s case, rather than an important element of the prosecution case.

3. The Recorder’s summing-up, viewed as a whole, was fair. It properly identified the prosecution evidence capable of supporting guilt, and there was no complaint that the defence case had been unfairly summarised. Although it would have been preferable to juxtapose the prosecution and defence cases issue by issue, the chosen structure did not cause unfairness. A corrected error in one passage did not affect the safety of the convictions.

4. The appeals against sentence were allowed. The court quashed the concurrent sentences of three years and substituted sentences of two years’ imprisonment for each appellant. It gave weight to their effective good character, the two earlier trials, delay, uncertainty about their benefit, and the confiscation consequences. Crucially, there was no evidence that either appellant knew the funds came from a predatory fraud directed at vulnerable victims.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Conviction appeals dismissed and sentence appeals allowed in part. The sentences of three years’ imprisonment were quashed and replaced with sentences of two years: [2009] EWCA Crim 543.

• Crown Court at Hull: Following a second retrial before Recorder Watson QC, the appellants were convicted under section 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment each.