Wood, R v

In diminished-responsibility manslaughter, the seriousness of the offence requires assessment of both culpability and harm. Reduced responsibility is inherent in the verdict, but it does not prevent a discretionary life sentence where the offender retains a high degree of responsibility and the killing is particularly grave.

When fixing a minimum term, the court may use the guidance in Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, subject to an allowance for the reduced culpability established under section 2 of the Homicide Act. Pre-2003 determinate sentences for manslaughter are not an accurate guide to the minimum terms now required.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Wolverhampton of murder after the jury rejected defences of provocation and diminished responsibility. He received life imprisonment with an 18-year minimum term.

On 20 June 2008, the Court of Appeal quashed the murder conviction and substituted manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility: R v Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305. The Crown did not seek a retrial for murder. The present five-judge court therefore sentenced the appellant for manslaughter.

The issues were whether the proper disposal was life imprisonment or imprisonment for public protection, and how to assess the minimum term for diminished-responsibility manslaughter.

1. The court imposed a discretionary sentence of imprisonment for life and fixed a minimum term of 13 years.

2. Under section 225(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, seriousness required consideration of both culpability and harm. Neither factor was paramount or exclusive. Although diminished responsibility reduced culpability, it did not make life imprisonment unavailable. The court accepted the approach in R v Chambers [1983] CAR (S) 190 and followed R v Kehoe [2008] CLR 728: life imprisonment in such cases would be rare, but could be justified where culpability remained particularly high or the offence was particularly grave.

3. This was such a case. The attack was prolonged, murderous and of extreme ferocity. The appellant had retained a very substantial degree of mental responsibility, despite the alcohol dependency syndrome which established diminished responsibility. His conduct before and after the killing, together with the continuing risk associated with alcohol, supported the conclusion that life imprisonment was appropriate.

4. There was no express statutory link between Schedule 21 and diminished-responsibility manslaughter. Nevertheless, when assessing seriousness for a minimum term, the court could have regard to its guidance, while allowing for the culpability reduction inherent in section 2 of the Homicide Act. The court distinguished the observation in R v Porter [2007] 1 CAR (S) 115 because it concerned provocation manslaughter and did not address that connection.

5. The trial judge’s 18-year minimum term for murder remained an appropriate assessment of the homicide’s gravity. It was reduced to 13 years to reflect diminished responsibility. Earlier determinate sentences for diminished-responsibility manslaughter, including those decided before the 2003 Act, could assist only on broad considerations and were no longer an accurate guide to minimum terms.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): This court imposed life imprisonment for the substituted manslaughter conviction and fixed a 13-year minimum term.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The murder conviction was quashed and a conviction for manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility was substituted: [2008] EWCA Crim 1305.

• Crown Court at Wolverhampton: The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with an 18-year minimum term.