Williams, R. v

The seriousness of manslaughter is assessed by reference to culpability and harm. Although death is always the gravest harm, culpability varies widely. Sentencing for manslaughter may properly take account of the legislative approach to murder in Criminal Justice Act 2003, Schedule 21, and of Parliament’s increased focus on offences causing death. That does not permit manslaughter to be sentenced as murder.

Deliberately driving a vehicle at a person, while recognising the inevitable risk of injury, may constitute manslaughter of very high culpability. It lies above causing death by dangerous driving but below murder where the necessary intent is unproved. Earlier sentencing authorities decided under a materially different statutory framework do not fix the proper level of sentence under the current law.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of manslaughter after he drove a stolen vehicle at Constable David Phillips during a high-speed police pursuit. The officer was killed. The appellant had also pleaded guilty to burglary and aggravated vehicle taking resulting in death.

William Davis J imposed 20 years’ detention in a young offender institution for manslaughter, with concurrent sentences for the other offences, and disqualified the appellant from driving for life. The appellant appealed against sentence, contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge had overstated both the gravity of the manslaughter and the hypothetical minimum term for murder.

The central issue was the proper sentencing approach to a deliberate vehicular manslaughter arising from dangerous driving and the extent to which homicide sentencing authorities and the statutory framework informed the sentence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence of 20 years was severe but not manifestly excessive. The appellant deliberately drove at a police officer after a prolonged and highly dangerous pursuit. Although the jury acquitted him of murder, the conduct necessarily involved a very high degree of culpability.

2. Under section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, seriousness depends on culpability and harm. In manslaughter, harm is at the highest level because death has occurred, but culpability may range greatly. The court endorsed the guidance that the legislative approach to murder in section 269 and Schedule 21 may inform sentencing for manslaughter, without equating the two offences. R v Wood [2009] EWCA Crim 651 and Attorney-General’s Ref No 60 of 2009 (Appleby & Ors) [2010] 2 Cr App R (S) 46 supported the increased weight to be given to the fact that an unlawful act caused death.

3. Manslaughter by driving occupies the range between causing death by dangerous driving and murder. It requires a very high risk of death and an additional degree of turpitude. Deliberately driving at a plainly visible police officer, even if the realisation was shortly before impact, met that description. The court applied the reasoning in R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 and Brown (Uriah) v The Queen [2005] UKPC 18.

4. Earlier vehicular-manslaughter sentences did not establish that a higher present sentence was wrong. Several had been committed before the Criminal Justice Act 2003 framework and increased statutory maxima. The court distinguished them on that basis. R v Willett [2011] EWCA Crim 2710 was also materially less serious because that appellant was a passenger, whereas this appellant was the driver and principal offender.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against the 20-year sentence for manslaughter.
• Crown Court at Manchester: convicted the appellant of manslaughter and sentenced him to 20 years’ detention in a young offender institution, with concurrent sentences for burglary and aggravated vehicle taking resulting in death.