Attorney General Reference No 111 of 2006

In a sentencing reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sentence for gross-negligence manslaughter involving a vehicle requires an individual assessment. Previous motor-manslaughter sentences may provide a broad comparison, but do not constitute guidelines. A plea offered on the eve of trial may justify only a 25 per cent reduction where the offender had earlier opportunities to plead guilty with legal advice.

Knowingly continuing to drive while a victim is trapped beneath a vehicle, persisting after any immediate danger has passed, and failing to stop or assist are grave aggravating features. If the original sentence is unduly lenient, the substituted sentence should reflect the seriousness of the offence while allowing for the double-jeopardy effect of a second sentencing.

The offender pleaded guilty at Wolverhampton Crown Court to manslaughter by gross negligence, on an indictment for murder. After the victim fell beneath the offender’s taxi, the offender drove for more than a mile while dragging him underneath the vehicle. The victim died from the resulting injuries.

On 18 September 2006, the Crown Court imposed three years’ imprisonment, a five-year driving disqualification, and an extended re-test requirement. The Attorney-General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. The central issue was whether the sentence adequately reflected the offender’s culpability despite his good character, fear and panic, and late guilty plea.

1. Reference allowed. The court granted leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and held that the three-year term was unduly lenient. It quashed that term and substituted five years’ imprisonment. The driving disqualification and extended re-test requirement remained unchanged.
2. Sentencing for gross-negligence manslaughter involving a vehicle is fact-sensitive. Decisions concerning causing death by dangerous driving may provide some assistance because aggravating and mitigating features can overlap. Their utility was limited, however, because dangerous driving has a lower maximum sentence and vehicle manslaughter varies greatly in character. The recent motor-manslaughter decisions cited by the court were not guidelines, although guilty-plea sentences in them suggested a broad four-to-seven-year first-instance bracket.
3. The 25 per cent guilty-plea reduction was correct. The plea was offered only on the eve of trial, after the offender had had earlier opportunities to offer it while represented. A larger reduction was not justified.
4. The decisive aggravating features were the offender’s conscious choice to put his fear before the victim’s life, his acceleration and continued driving while aware that the victim was trapped beneath the taxi, and his failure to stop or render assistance after the body became dislodged. The initial fear or panic did not remove the exceptionally serious and prolonged wanton disregard for life.
5. A sentence of six years would have been appropriate at first instance after the plea discount. Because this was an Attorney-General’s reference and the offender was being sentenced again, the court made an allowance for double jeopardy and substituted five years. The 12 days spent on remand were to count towards that sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2006] EWCA Crim 3269, the court granted leave and allowed the Attorney-General’s reference. It quashed the three-year term and substituted five years’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Wolverhampton: The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter on 14 August 2006. On 18 September 2006, His Honour Judge Chapman imposed three years’ imprisonment, a five-year driving disqualification, and an extended driving test requirement.