Hussain v R.

In sentencing reckless manslaughter committed by driving on after a road collision, the court must assess culpability for the continuing conduct. A faultless initial collision does not reduce the gravity of knowingly continuing to drive while risking serious injury or death to a person trapped beneath the vehicle. Comparative sentencing authorities require attention to material differences in culpability. Youth, serious cognitive limitation affecting response in a crisis, and a materially shorter period of dangerous conduct may justify a substantial reduction from a superficially similar case. Delay substantially caused by the offender will usually carry limited mitigating weight.

The appellant’s car struck a two-year-old child who had run into the road. The initial collision was not his fault. After stopping momentarily, however, the appellant drove away with the child trapped beneath the car. The child later died from multiple head injuries.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter at Birmingham Crown Court before Coulson J and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, subject to credit for time on remand. He was also disqualified from driving. He appealed against sentence, contending that the judge had set the sentencing exercise too high, particularly when compared with other driving-death cases and in light of his youth, very low IQ, limited driving experience and delay.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. It was reduced to six years’ imprisonment, less 232 days already served. The remainder of the sentence was affirmed.
2. The Crown case, and the basis on which the appellant was convicted, was reckless manslaughter. At some point, although the precise point could not be identified, he knew that the child was trapped beneath the car, foresaw the risk of serious injury or death if he drove on, and nevertheless did so. The court considered that the evidence and the verdict did not make the possible extent of injury at the initial, blameless impact material mitigation.
3. There were serious aggravating features. The appellant drove away after the death and persisted in denying that he was the driver, causing further suffering to the child’s family. Mitigation included his very low IQ, learning disability, previous good character and favourable references. The court also upheld the judge’s conclusion that delay was of only minor significance because much of it was attributable to the appellant.
4. R v Richardson and Others [2006] EWCA Crim 3186 offered limited assistance. It concerned causing death by dangerous driving, whereas the appellant knowingly continued to drive while taking the risk that the trapped child would be killed or seriously injured. By contrast, the appellant’s conduct was significantly less culpable than that in Attorney-General’s Reference No.111 of 2006 (Ghulam Hussain) [2006] EWCA Crim 3269. He was far younger, had substantial cognitive limitations in a crisis, and drove a materially shorter distance than the mature professional driver in that comparator case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against sentence in part and reduced the term from eight years to six years: [2012] EWCA Crim 188.
• Crown Court at Birmingham (Coulson J): Convicted the appellant of manslaughter and imposed eight years’ imprisonment, with driving disqualification.