Dobby, R v (Rev 1)

Where a road-death case is properly charged as gross negligence manslaughter, the sentencing court may take an approach different from that for the statutory offence of causing death by dangerous driving. The statutory maximum for the driving offence must not, however, be circumvented solely through the prosecution’s choice of charge. The statutory driving guideline may properly inform the assessment, although it is not binding where sentence for manslaughter is at large.

On an Attorney General’s reference under Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Court of Appeal may interfere only where the sentence is unduly lenient. The possibility that another judge might impose a somewhat longer term does not meet that threshold.

The offender pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to two counts of gross negligence manslaughter, causing serious injury by dangerous driving, and dangerous driving. His driving while evading police caused the deaths of a mother and child and seriously injured another child.

The Recorder of London imposed concurrent extended sentences, producing a total sentence of 15 years, comprising 12 years’ custody and a three-year extension period. The Attorney General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The central issue was whether the sentence inadequately reflected the manslaughter convictions and the exceptionally dangerous driving.

1. Leave was granted, but the Attorney General’s reference was dismissed. The sentence was not unduly lenient. The Recorder had considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the dangerousness finding, the concurrent terms, and totality. His conclusion was properly open to him.

2. A sentence may be imposed for gross negligence manslaughter where the conduct falls within the space above causing death by dangerous driving but below murder. Where manslaughter is properly charged, a different sentencing approach from that available for a statutory driving offence may be justified by the facts and circumstances.

3. The 14-year maximum for causing death by dangerous driving must not be evaded merely because the prosecution selects a manslaughter charge. Nevertheless, the Recorder was entitled to have regard to the dangerous-driving guideline. He was not bound by it, and had in fact selected a pre-plea starting point above the statutory maximum.

4. The absence of a deliberate attempt to drive at, or target, the victims was material. The offender deliberately drove in an appallingly dangerous manner to evade police, but he did not deliberately drive at the family group. That feature distinguished the case from authorities involving a vehicle deliberately used against a victim.

5. Under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, this court could interfere only if the sentence was unduly lenient. A view that some judges might have imposed a slightly longer sentence was insufficient. The extended sentence of 15 years therefore stood.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The Attorney General’s reference was dismissed in [2017] EWCA Crim 775, following the grant of leave.
• Central Criminal Court: On 10 March 2017, the Recorder of London imposed a 15-year extended sentence for two counts of manslaughter and concurrent driving offences.