McCann, R v

A judge must leave self-defence to the jury if it arises on any view of the evidence, regardless of the parties’ agreement. Where the evidence provides no proper basis for it, however, the judge should not introduce the issue merely because jurors refer to a fight.

A Watson direction is exceptional and lies within the trial judge’s discretion. A direction accurately given in an appropriate case does not make a verdict unsafe merely because it may encourage agreement. The duration and circumstances of the jury’s further deliberations may show that no undue pressure was applied.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of murdering Luke Lodge. He had entered the flat where the deceased was sleeping, wearing a disguise, and stabbed him after threatening to kill him. The prosecution relied on identification evidence and the appellant’s subsequent admissions and conduct.

At trial the appellant disputed that he was the attacker and also advanced diminished responsibility. Self-defence had been agreed not to arise. After two jury notes referring to a fight, the judge confirmed that it was not an issue. During extended deliberations, the judge gave a Watson direction. The jury later convicted by a majority of ten to two.

The appeal challenged the refusal to leave self-defence and contended that the Watson direction had exerted undue pressure on the jury.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court refused the renewed application for leave on the self-defence ground and dismissed the appeal against conviction.
2. Self-defence must be left to the jury where it arises on one view of the evidence, even if the defence does not seek such a direction. That established requirement did not assist the appellant. The evidence disclosed a planned and direct attack: the assailant forced entry while disguised, went to the bedroom armed with a knife, threatened to kill the deceased, and inflicted the fatal wound to the deceased’s back. The material concerning earlier incidents and the presence of a screwdriver did not provide an evidential basis for self-defence. The judge was therefore correct to tell the jury that it was not an issue.
3. The judge had given a direction closely following the form approved in Watson. Such a direction is not routine and should be given relatively rarely. Its use is nevertheless a matter for the judge’s discretion in appropriate circumstances and is not wrong in law merely because it invites jurors to discuss, listen and seek agreement consistently with their oaths.
4. There was no real risk that the direction produced an involuntary verdict. The jury had deliberated for a considerable time before it was given, continued deliberating for the rest of that day, and deliberated for a further hour and 22 minutes after the weekend before returning their majority verdict. The case also involved several issues, including identity, the asserted black-out and diminished responsibility. The judge’s exercise of discretion could not be faulted and the verdict remained safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2009] EWCA Crim 819.
• Central Criminal Court: convicted the appellant of murder by a majority of ten to two and imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 21 years, less time spent on remand.