Wilson, R. v

A whole life order is a sentence of last resort, reserved for offences of the most extreme gravity. In assessing whether it is justified, earlier convictions may substantially aggravate the seriousness of the current offences where there is a clear link between them. Their use must nevertheless reflect that the offender is being sentenced only for the current offending.

A life sentence may remain necessary to protect the public, while the punitive element is fixed by a minimum term. The continuing risk to public safety is then addressed through the life sentence and the conditions governing any eventual release.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Blackfriars Crown Court to attempted rape, wounding with intent, and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent. The sentencing judge imposed life sentences on the first two counts under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 225, ordered that he serve a whole life term, and imposed a concurrent five-year sentence on the third count.

The applicant accepted that he met the statutory dangerousness criteria and did not challenge the appropriateness of a life sentence. His appeal concerned the whole life order. He contended that his earlier convictions were relevant to risk but could not justify dispensing with a fixed minimum term for the current offences.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court upheld the life sentences for attempted rape and wounding with intent, but replaced the whole life order with a minimum term of ten years, subject to credit for remand time.
2. A whole life order is very rarely appropriate. Whether imposed with a mandatory or discretionary life sentence, it is a sentence of last resort for cases of the most extreme gravity. The current offences were exceptionally serious, but viewed alone they did not justify a whole life term.
3. The applicant's earlier rape and murder offences were not irrelevant merely because they were historic. Under section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, there was a clear link between those offences and the current crimes. The earlier offences therefore materially aggravated the seriousness of the present offending. They had to be treated cautiously because the applicant was not being sentenced again for them.
4. The life sentence was necessary to protect the public. The applicant could not be released unless it was shown that he no longer posed a threat to public safety, and the court considered that release might never become appropriate. That protective purpose did not remove the need to fix the punitive element of the sentence.
5. Allowing for the guilty plea, the court assessed the punitive element at 20 years. It ordered a minimum period of ten years, reflecting the early-release calculation, with remand credit under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the sentence appeal in part. It upheld the life sentences but replaced the whole life order with a ten-year minimum term: [2009] EWCA Crim 999.
• Crown Court at Blackfriars: Following guilty pleas, imposed life imprisonment under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on two counts, with a whole life order, and a concurrent five-year sentence on the third count.