Johnson v MGN Ltd

On an application to determine whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the court should reject a pleaded meaning only where a jury would be perverse to accept it. The exercise is generous rather than parsimonious, particularly where the publication is ambiguous or opaquely written. The court must distinguish between deciding whether words are capable of bearing a meaning and deciding whether that meaning is ultimately proved. A pleaded innuendo may survive even where the relevant class of readers is very small, provided the words are capable of conveying the alleged implication to readers possessing the pleaded extrinsic facts.

The claimant, a professional footballer contracted to Portsmouth, brought a libel claim concerning an article in The People. The article reported that Liverpool intended to sign him, referred to his tour of Liverpool’s training ground, and stated that his absence from a Boxing Day match was reportedly due to injury.

The claimant pleaded that the words suggested either that he had lied, or been party to a misleading announcement, about the injury and that he had breached Premier League Rules concerning approaches to contracted players. The defendant applied under CPR 53, PD 4.1 for a ruling that neither the natural and ordinary meaning nor the innuendo meaning was capable of being conveyed.

1. Application refused. The court rejected the defendant’s applications in respect of both pleaded meanings, although with greater hesitation concerning the innuendo.
2. On an application of this kind, the court fixes the permissible meanings in advance because they affect the assessment of reputational injury and any defences. It must exclude meanings that depend on a strained or utterly unreasonable interpretation. The proper question is whether a jury would be perverse to uphold the pleaded meaning. The exercise is one of generosity, not parsimony, particularly where the article is ambiguously or opaquely written.
3. The article was capable of conveying an innuendo of disloyal or unauthorised conduct to a small class of readers who knew the relevant contractual circumstances and Premier League Rules. The fact that the class was likely to be very small did not justify removing the meaning at this stage.
4. The article was also capable of conveying a natural and ordinary meaning that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant was responsible for, or party to, a misleading announcement explaining his absence from the Boxing Day match. The wording cast doubt on the reported knee injury and was sufficiently ambiguous that it could not be said that a jury accepting the pleaded inference would be perverse.
5. The court did not determine whether the meanings were true, reasonable, or ultimately established. Those matters remained for the trial tribunal. The defendant’s applications were therefore dismissed.