Smithkline Beecham Plc & Ors v Avery & Ors (Representing Stop Huntingdon Cruelty ("Shac")

A representative injunction may be granted against unidentified persons sharing a sufficient common interest in resisting the injunction, whether or not they form an unincorporated association. The relevant question is the sharing of interest, not the label attached to the group.

Facts supporting civil relief under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 are proved on the balance of probabilities. A company may be a victim for the purposes of section 1(1A)(c), although section 7(5) limits harassment of a person to harassment of an individual. A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures future unlawful conduct may be restrained where the risk and justice of intervention justify an injunction.

The claimant pharmaceutical companies and a representative claimant sought final injunctions restraining trespass and harassment by persons acting in the names of SHAC and the ALF. The proceedings followed interim orders made by Beatson J and Teare J. The central issues were whether the groups could be represented under CPR 19.6, who should act as representative defendants, whether injunctions should be granted against the named individuals, and whether corporate claimants could obtain relief under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The defendants accepted that some injunctive relief was inevitable. The dispute concerned its proper defendants, representation and terms.

1. The court granted final injunctions in substantially the form sought. The evidence established a strong probability that unlawful trespass, harassment and intimidation would resume without the interim order.

2. Under CPR 19.6 the decisive question is whether the persons intended to be represented share a sufficient interest in the claim. In this context that meant a common interest in resisting the injunction so that the campaign could continue. It was unnecessary to determine whether the ALF was an unincorporated association. The ALF and SHAC groups were sufficiently identifiable and had the required common interest.

3. Mr Trundley was an appropriate representative of the Protected Persons. Mr Webb was suitable to represent persons acting in the name of the ALF because of his longstanding role as its press officer. Dr Gastone was suitable, in addition to Mr Avery, to represent SHAC. Mr Avery remained an appropriate representative and was also personally subject to an injunction when released from prison.

4. The civil standard of proof applied to an application under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The seriousness of the allegations did not alter that standard, although inherent probabilities remained relevant. The likelihood of future tortious conduct had to be assessed by reference to all relevant circumstances, including the nature of the threatened harm and the interests of the parties and third persons.

5. Section 7(5) limited harassment of a person to harassment of an individual. It did not limit the person whom section 1(1A)(c) protected. A company could therefore seek an injunction under section 3A where the statutory conditions were met.

6. Mr Webb and Dr Gastone were likely to aid, abet, counsel or procure unlawful conduct within section 7(3A). Injunctions against them personally were therefore justified. The restriction on Mr Webb’s expression was proportionate because it prevented encouragement of criminal acts.

7. The proposed amendments to the injunction were rejected. The final order restrained the relevant unlawful conduct and preserved defined demonstration areas and exclusion zones.

First-instance judgment. The proceedings had been commenced by interim order before Beatson J, continued with modification by Teare J, and proceeded to trial before Mr Justice Jack.