Buxton & Ors, R. v

As amended, section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 permits a restraining order to protect a company. It may also protect a clearly defined group of persons. The court must nevertheless decide whether the order is appropriate on the evidence. Practical advantages of an order do not suffice where there is no evidence of actual harassment, conduct close to harassment, or a real prospective fear of harassment or violence.

Twelve environmental protesters pleaded guilty at Merthyr Tydfil Crown Court to malicious obstruction of a railway. The prosecution did not proceed on a second count. Each defendant received a two-year conditional discharge, costs orders and, in some cases, compensation.

The judge also made identical restraining orders under section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The orders named Miller Argent (South Wales Ltd) as the protected person and prohibited attendance on specified land, roads and railways connected with the mine and railway.

The appeals challenged whether a company or its employees could be protected by such an order and, if so, whether an order was appropriate on these facts.

1. The appeals were allowed to the extent that the restraining orders were set aside. The court held that the orders were not appropriate on the evidence in these cases.

2. Section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, as amended, is not confined to convictions for harassment and does not require proof of further harassment. The statutory definition of “person” includes a corporate body. In principle, therefore, a restraining order may name a limited company as the protected person. The pre-amendment authorities, including Mann 99/7589/X5 and Dziurzynski [2002] EWHC 1380, did not preclude that conclusion.

3. The court also stated that an order may protect a group, such as employees, if the group is sufficiently clearly defined. The protected persons and the defendant must be able to identify who is and is not within the order.

4. However, a lawful power to make an order does not establish that its exercise is appropriate. Here, the sentencing judge had found that the protesters intended to avoid physical risk. The Crown had produced no evidence of actual harassment, conduct close to it, or conduct giving rise to a real fear of future harassment or violence. The practical utility of excluding the defendants from the site could not justify a potentially onerous order in those circumstances.

5. The court emphasised that comparable future conduct could justify an order if there were evidence supporting a real fear of future harassment or violence, whether the proposed protected person were a company or its employees.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the appeals to the extent of setting aside the restraining orders.
• Merthyr Tydfil Crown Court The applicants pleaded guilty to malicious obstruction of a railway and were conditionally discharged. The court also made restraining orders under section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.