Case details
Summary
In a malicious-falsehood claim, the single meaning rule applies as it does in defamation. The court must determine the one natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the reasonable reader. Where two meanings are reasonably possible, one alleging falsity and the other not, the meaning that does not allege falsity should be adopted, with particular regard to freedom of expression under Human Rights Act 1998 s 12(4). Advertising must be assessed in context. Vague promotional language, hyperbole and invitations to consumers should not be treated as factual assertions where that would be unreasonable.
Factual background
The claimant, a manufacturer and seller of aspartame, brought a malicious-falsehood claim against a supermarket. The claim concerned packaging and an email stating that certain products contained no aspartame. The claimant alleged that these statements implied that aspartame was especially or potentially harmful or unhealthy and that consumers should avoid it.
The court was directed to determine meaning as a preliminary issue. The central questions were whether the single meaning rule applied to malicious falsehood and, if so, what meaning the packaging and email conveyed to the reasonable consumer.
Held
- Preliminary issue and single meaning. The court held that the single meaning rule applies to malicious falsehood. The rule balances freedom of expression and protection against legally actionable falsehood. Consistency also favours applying the same interpretative rule where a claimant could choose between defamation and malicious falsehood.
- Adapted approach. Where two meanings are reasonably possible, and one alleges that the statement is false while the other does not, the court should adopt the meaning in which falsity is not alleged. Particular regard must be paid to freedom of expression under Human Rights Act 1998 s 12(4).
- Advertising and reasonable interpretation. Meaning depends on the whole context, including wording, presentation, fonts and colours. Advertising may use vague promotional language, hyperbole and attempts to attract customers. It is unreasonable to interpret every form of expression as a statement of fact or opinion, or to select a strained and scandalous meaning where a more credible interpretation is available.
- Application. The words “Good for you”, “no hidden nasties” and “no aspartame” conveyed approval of products without aspartame and disapproval of products containing it, but did not convey that aspartame was especially or actually harmful. If meaning [2] were considered, both potential harm and a non-serious marketing appeal were reasonably possible. The single meaning rule required rejection of the meaning alleging potential harm. The cola wording led to the same result, and the email required no separate answer.
- Conclusion. The packaging conveyed that the products were suitable for customers who thought aspartame might be bad for them, or unpleasant to taste or consume. It did not convey that aspartame was actually or potentially harmful or unhealthy.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appeal to higher court
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