Imerman v Tchenguiz & Ors

Summary judgment may be granted where the claimant establishes the propositions essential to the limited relief sought, even though other pleaded issues require trial.

Information taken wholesale from a password-protected computer system may be treated as confidential without requiring the claimant to identify every protected item. The court may restrain retention, use and onward disclosure where the material was obtained from a private source. Arguments based on public interest or assistance in matrimonial proceedings do not justify continued retention where lawful court procedures were available and the relevant family court can determine admissibility and use.

The court may grant limited injunctive relief without deciding statutory offences, data-protection breaches, damages or all factual disputes.

The claimant sought summary judgment and limited injunctions concerning confidential personal, financial and business information copied from a shared computer system by the first defendant and accessed or retained by other defendants. The information had been gathered in connection with the claimant’s pending matrimonial proceedings, including material potentially protected by legal professional privilege.

The defendants disputed whether access was authorised, whether the information was confidential, whether retention was justified by the public interest or the claimant’s wife’s Article 6 rights, and whether statutory offences or data-protection breaches had occurred. The claimant accepted, for the purposes of the application, a number of factual disputes and sought relief directed principally to taking the material out of circulation pending further proceedings.

1. Limited summary relief granted. The claimant was entitled to injunctions preventing the defendants from communicating, disclosing, copying or using the specified categories of information. It was unnecessary to establish every pleaded issue or every defendant’s precise involvement. The relevant question was whether the propositions essential to the limited relief were established.
2. The defendants’ argument that the claimant had to identify every confidential item within the very large quantity of material taken was unattractive. Documents stored on a password-protected computer could, at least prima facie, be regarded as confidential by virtue of that protection alone. The relief was concerned with material obtained from the claimant’s private source and with removing it from circulation.
3. The claimed justification based on protecting the claimant’s wife’s Article 6 rights and assisting the matrimonial proceedings did not justify continued retention. The Family Division retained control over relevance, admissibility and use. If preservation or search orders were justified by strong evidence of non-disclosure, they could be sought through the court. The defendants’ extra-judicial efforts were therefore inappropriate, although the public-interest argument was not finally determined.
4. The court did not decide whether the Computer Misuse Act 1990 or the Data Protection Act 1998 had been infringed, whether any statutory defence applied, or whether the conduct was unlawful so as to support damages. Those matters were unnecessary to the limited injunctions.
5. The claim concerning privileged material did not require the claimant to identify every document in a mixed collection. The defendants’ position that they could retain documents unless the claimant individually identified them was not accepted. A solicitor holding material for a client acquired no greater right to retain it merely because of that status, apart from any court order.
6. The first defendant’s disclosure application concerning the 17 Whyte & Mackay documents was refused. He had already seen the relevant Earlcrown accounts and therefore had sufficient material to formulate the proposed allegation. The application appeared to be retaliatory.

First-instance decision. No earlier appellate decision is stated in the judgment.