Stockton-On-Tees Borough Council v Latif

A statutory appeal period is mandatory where the legislation fixes a period and provides no power to extend it. The absence of an express extension provision, together with a statutory duty to notify the person of the period, supports strict compliance. The general case-management power in CPR 3.1(2)(a) permits extensions of time for rules, practice directions and court orders. It does not permit extension of a statutory limitation period. A purposive approach does not justify implying such a power where the statutory language is clear and the statutory scheme provides an alternative route to seek a new licence.

The Council appealed by case stated from a decision of Teesside Crown Court, which had allowed the respondent’s appeal from the magistrates and remitted his licensing appeal for determination on the merits. The Crown Court held that the 21-day period for appealing against the revocation of a hackney carriage and private hire vehicle licence could be extended under CPR 3.1(2)(a).

The High Court had to decide whether the statutory scheme conferred jurisdiction to extend the period, whether the CPR applied, and whether the magistrates or Crown Court had power to extend the time under section 300 of the Public Health Act 1936.

1. The appeal was allowed. The statutory appeal period of 21 days under section 300(2) of the Public Health Act 1936, as applied by section 77 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, was mandatory. The legislation provided no power to extend it.
2. The statutory language was clear. Parliament could have provided for an extension, as it had done in section 18(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, but had not done so. The requirement under section 300(3) to notify the person of the right of appeal and the applicable period reinforced the importance of compliance.
3. A purposive interpretation did not justify implying an extension power. Strict compliance was not unduly draconian because a former licence holder could apply for a new licence, with a further right of appeal if necessary.
4. CPR 3.1(2)(a) did not assist. Its reference to extending or shortening time concerned compliance with a rule, practice direction or court order. It did not confer jurisdiction to extend a statutory time limit. The court adopted the reasoning of Latham LJ in The District Court of Vilnius City v Barcys [2007] EWHC 615 (Admin).
5. The answers to the stated questions were yes, yes and no. The Crown Court had therefore erred in extending time. The Council’s own time for lodging this appeal was extended because the delay was not its fault and caused no prejudice. The respondent was ordered to pay £2,000 towards the Council’s costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the Council’s appeal by case stated and held that the statutory 21-day period could not be extended.
• Teesside Crown Court: Allowed the respondent’s appeal from the magistrates, held that time could be extended, and remitted the licensing appeal for a hearing on the merits.
• Teesside Magistrates’ Court: Declined to entertain the respondent’s appeal because it was lodged outside the 21-day period.