Williams v MGM Ltd

In a libel claim, an allegation that a claimant is a police informer may, in the relevant context, be incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning as a matter of public policy. A claim may also be an abuse of process where it cannot serve the legitimate purpose of protecting reputation and any vindication or damages would be minimal compared with the resources required. The court must consider proportionality, court resources and freedom of expression. A claim brought outside the primary limitation period will not justify an extension where the circumstances provide no compelling reason to disapply limitation.

The claimant sued over a Daily Mirror article which referred to him as an accomplice and, in a photograph caption, as a henchman of a convicted crime boss. He alleged that the publication identified him to fellow prisoners as a police informer and challenged the accuracy of the article.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4 or for summary judgment under CPR 24.2. The issues included whether the alleged meaning that the claimant was a police informer was defamatory, whether the claim was an abuse because it could not protect any substantial reputation, and whether the court should extend the limitation period.

1. The claim was struck out under CPR 3.4. The court could not determine the truth of the factual allegations on the interlocutory application, but could determine whether the pleaded meanings were legally actionable.

2. The allegation that the claimant was a police informer, or “grass”, was incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning in the relevant context. The authorities required the court to assess the allegation by reference to right-thinking people generally, rather than the criminal fraternity. Conduct regarded adversely by criminals may enhance a person’s reputation in the eyes of society generally.

3. The claim concerning the “henchman” caption was an abuse of process. Applying the principles in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones Inc [2005] QB 946, the court had to ensure that defamation proceedings served the legitimate purpose of protecting reputation. The claimant’s serious criminal convictions, the limited scope for vindication, the likely modest damages and the disproportionate cost of a libel trial meant that the claim could not constitute a real and substantial tort.

4. The court also considered limitation. The claim was plainly out of time, and there was no reason to exercise the discretion under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980. No application for that relief had been made.

5. The application was upheld and the claim was struck out.