Lait v Evening Standard Ltd

The single meaning rule applies when determining a defence of honest comment. Where an honestly expressed media comment rests on sufficient facts but may carry an additional, unsupported imputation, liability for that additional meaning will not ordinarily arise without malice.

The court may stop such a claim as an abuse of process where trial offers no realistic, tangible or legitimate advantage proportionate to the expense and use of court resources. It must balance access to justice and vindication against freedom of expression, the strength and gravity of the additional imputation, any malice, and whether that meaning was identified promptly. An exceptionally serious additional imputation may nevertheless justify a trial.

A former Member of Parliament brought libel proceedings over an article concerning parliamentary expenses. The article incorrectly stated that she had been forced to repay nearly £25,000 after making a capital gain on a taxpayer-funded home. She alleged meanings involving underhanded concealment and hypocrisy. The publisher pleaded justification and honest comment.

Eady J dismissed the claimant’s application for summary judgment and granted the publisher summary judgment on honest comment. He found that the article necessarily conveyed that people could legitimately be angry that an MP who had benefited from the expenses system criticised its proposed reform. Any implication of hypocrisy was additional, while the mistaken repayment allegation added no material sting.

The claimant appealed. The central issues were whether the single meaning rule applied to honest comment and whether the possible unsupported implication of hypocrisy required a trial.

1. Appeal dismissed. The single meaning rule applies to the adjudication of an honest comment defence. The tribunal must attribute one natural and ordinary meaning to the words. Where a jury determines the defence, the required majority must apply the same meaning. Merivale v Carson, Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Burstein v Associated Newspapers Ltd supported that conclusion.

2. The article necessarily conveyed the “shut up” meaning: readers might react angrily to an MP who had benefited from the former expenses system publicly opposing reform. The claimant’s use of that system supplied a sufficient factual substratum for honest comment. A charge of hypocrisy was, at most, a possible additional implication rather than an alternative meaning.

3. The principles in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc permit the court to stop defamation proceedings which do not serve the legitimate purpose of protecting reputation. The inquiry is not merely whether the claim is trivial. It requires a balance between access to vindication, proportionality, court resources and the right to freedom of expression under Article 10.

4. Per Laws LJ, where an honestly expressed media comment rests on sufficient facts but may reasonably carry an unsupported additional imputation, the publisher should not ordinarily be liable for that imputation unless it was maliciously advanced. Exceptionally, an adventitious imputation may be sufficiently serious to require the claim to proceed.

5. The Master of the Rolls agreed that particular care is required before an arguable claim is stopped. Eady J was nevertheless entitled to strike out this claim. Hypocrisy was not overtly alleged and was only a weak possible implication; malice was not alleged; the imputation was at the lower end of the defamatory scale in the context of political debate; and neither the initial complaint nor the original pleading identified it.

6. The inaccurate repayment allegation did not sustain a separate “underhanded concealment” meaning. Its material sting lay in retaining a capital gain produced with taxpayer-assisted mortgage payments, and those underlying facts remained available. The judge applied the Jameel principle, not a hypothetical equivalent of s.5 of the Defamation Act 1952.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court unanimously dismissed the claimant’s appeal and upheld Eady J’s disposal of the summary judgment applications: [2011] EWCA Civ 859.

2. High Court: On 9 December 2010 Eady J dismissed the claimant’s application for summary judgment against the defences of justification and honest comment, and granted the publisher summary judgment on honest comment. No citation is stated.

3. High Court: On 25 March 2010 Eady J struck out the originally pleaded meaning as incapable of being borne by the words, while permitting amended particulars. No citation is stated.