Briggs v Jordan & Ors

At the permission-to-amend stage, the court applies the test governing whether the pleaded words are capable of bearing the alleged defamatory meanings. The court assesses the publication as a whole through the eyes of the hypothetical reasonable reader. A statement that an employee was sacked does not, without more, imply culpable conduct. Pompous style, reasonable fear during business crises, and adverse comparisons between business partners may fall below the threshold of seriousness required for defamation. An innuendo based on extrinsic facts must identify a representation or publication which is inconsistent with those facts and capable of conveying the pleaded meaning. A new privacy claim should generally be brought separately where the existing claim is being struck out. Health information ordinarily attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The claimant brought a libel action concerning passages in an autobiography written by the first defendant and published by the second and third defendants. He sought permission to amend his Particulars of Claim to allege defamatory meanings concerning his dismissal, communications, conduct during business incidents and role in establishing a jointly owned mobile-phone business. He also sought to add claims for breach of confidence and misuse of private information, based on alleged disclosures concerning a share-sale agreement and his health. The central issues were whether the proposed meanings were capable of arising, whether the confidentiality allegations disclosed an arguable claim, and whether the privacy claim could properly be added to the existing action.

1. Defamation. The court applied the meaning principles summarised in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130. The words had to be read as a whole, from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable reader, avoiding strained interpretations and taking account of the applicable threshold of seriousness.
2. The passages were not capable of conveying that the claimant had been sacked because of his own fault, had sent frivolous messages, was given to panic, or was ineffective in ordinary business challenges. The references to “Frankly, I am astonished” could convey a pompous style, but that meaning did not meet the required threshold of seriousness. The two incidents relied on to suggest panic described particular and objectively stressful business situations, not a general propensity to panic.
3. The pleaded innuendo also failed. Saying that the first defendant was the principal force behind the business did not, by itself, imply that the claimant had misrepresented his role. The claimant had not identified any representation, interview or article which was inconsistent with his having been a key figure while occupying a more limited role than the first defendant.
4. Confidence and privacy. The alleged disclosures concerning the share-sale agreement did not disclose its provisions or subject matter. The claim would also have been liable to strike out for absence of loss and abuse of process, applying Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946 and Lait v Evening Standard Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 859.
5. Medical information generally carries a reasonable expectation of privacy. The proposed health-information claim was not inherently unsustainable, applying Sullivan v Bristol Film Studios Ltd [2012] EMLR 27, but it should be brought as a fresh claim rather than added to the action otherwise being struck out. Permission to amend was dismissed and the claim was struck out.