Cleveland Police, R (on the application of) v H

For a sexual offences prevention order under Sexual Offences Act 2003, the court must first establish, to the criminal standard, the conduct relied upon. It must then decide whether that conduct gives reasonable cause to believe that an order is necessary to protect the public from serious sexual harm. The proceedings remain civil, and hearsay evidence is admissible, but the seriousness of the allegations and the consequences of an order require a high standard of proof. An acquittal does not automatically prevent reliance on the underlying allegations, and the absence of a prosecution is not automatically decisive. The outcome depends on the evidence and circumstances of each case.

The Cleveland Police sought a sexual offences prevention order against H under section 104 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. H was a qualifying offender because of a 1996 conviction. The order was based principally on allegations made in 2001 and 2007.

The Magistrates made the order, but the Crown Court allowed H’s appeal. The Crown Court treated the 2007 allegations as unreliable following H’s acquittal at trial and considered the 2001 allegations insufficiently established. The police appealed by way of case stated. The central issues were the applicable standard of proof, the use of hearsay and unprosecuted or acquitted allegations, and whether the Crown Court’s decision was reasonably open to it.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The Crown Court’s decision was one that could reasonably have been reached.

2. Section 104(5)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 contains two elements. The court must establish that the qualifying offender has acted in the relevant way since the appropriate date. It must then determine whether the conduct gives reasonable cause to believe that an order is necessary for the protection of the public from serious sexual harm.

3. The proceedings are civil, but the conduct relied upon must be established to the criminal standard. The civil standard is applied with the strictness required by the seriousness of the allegations and the serious restrictions imposed by a sexual offences prevention order. The necessity of the order is a matter of judgment or evaluation once the underlying conduct has been established.

4. Hearsay evidence is admissible. Its weight depends on the circumstances and the factors identified in the Civil Evidence Act 1995. Where the alleged conduct is disputed, the evidence must be heard and tested. Direct evidence is not invariably required, and hearsay may be sufficient when supported by admissions or other corroborative material.

5. An acquittal does not automatically prevent reliance on the underlying allegations. Here, however, the trial judge’s findings showed that the child complainant’s evidence was conflicting and unreliable, so the 2007 allegations could not be established to the required standard.

6. The absence of a prosecution in respect of the 2001 allegations was not, by itself, a bar to relying on them. Nevertheless, on the evidence available in this case, the allegations had not been sufficiently established. The 2001 matters also could not independently demonstrate the present danger required to justify the order.

7. The possible application of section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 was left undecided. The court observed that a narrow construction of the time limit might create difficulty where vulnerable victims delay reporting sexual conduct.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): the appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. The court held that the Crown Court’s decision could reasonably have been reached.

2. Teeside Crown Court: allowed H’s appeal against the Magistrates’ decision to make a sexual offences prevention order.

3. Magistrates’ Court: made a sexual offences prevention order under section 104 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.