Garrett v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police

For a destruction application under Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, s. 4B(1)(a), the six-month period in s. 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 runs from the seizure of the dog, at the earliest. The relevant matter is not the incident which led to the seizure, the police’s knowledge of it, or alleged wrongdoing. Section 4B(1)(a) creates a freestanding application concerning the dog where no prosecution is brought. It is distinct from the offence-based warrant procedure under s. 5(2). The court left open whether, in an appropriate case, the matter of complaint might arise after seizure.

The owner appealed by case stated from a decision of Birmingham Magistrates’ Court ordering the destruction of her Rottweiler under s. 4B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The dog had bitten an adult on 23 April 2017. Police were informed on 3 May, seized the dog under a warrant on 19 May, and made the destruction application on 14 November. The magistrates held that the complaint was within the six-month limit in s. 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. The issue was whether time ran from the incident, police knowledge, or seizure.

1. Appeal dismissed. The destruction order stood. The six-month period under s. 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 ran, at the earliest, from seizure of the dog.
2. Section 4B(1)(a) is not offence-based or incident-based. Its focus is what is to happen to a seized dog where no person has been or is to be prosecuted. The incident may precipitate the application, but it is not necessarily the matter of complaint.
3. The application under s. 4B(1)(a) is separate from the warrant procedure under s. 5(2). Seizure is a statutory precondition, but the matters relied on in the destruction application need not be confined to those supporting the warrant and may include facts arising after seizure.
4. The discretion under s. 4B(1)(a) is engaged by two conditions: seizure under s. 5(1) or (2), and the absence of a prosecution or intended prosecution in respect of the dog. The considerations in s. 4B(2) and (2A) apply only to s. 4B(1)(b), although they may be relevant to the general discretion under paragraph (1)(a).
5. The approach was consistent with RSPCA v Webb [2015] EWHC 3802 (Admin). That decision recognised that the matter of complaint might arise at or after seizure, depending on the facts. Whether a date later than seizure could apply was left open. The different starting points for criminal prosecutions and the civil application under s. 4B were not irrational because the statutory regimes are separate.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division), Divisional Court: appeal by case stated dismissed; the magistrates’ jurisdiction was upheld and the destruction order stood.
2. Birmingham Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Qureshi rejected the limitation objection and ordered destruction of the dog on 16 April 2018.