Meany & Ors, R (on the application of) v Harlow District Council

A public authority must consciously address its statutory equality duties before making a relevant decision. Due regard is context-sensitive and requires rigorous, open-minded consideration of the statutory objectives. General awareness of equality issues is insufficient where the authority does not assess the particular impact of the option selected.

The authority may determine the weight given to countervailing considerations, subject to rationality review. A formal equality impact assessment is not invariably required. However, materially different options, such as cuts of substantially different scales, cannot be treated alike without appropriate consideration of their distinct equality implications.

A district council decided to reduce annual funding for discretionary welfare rights and advice services from approximately £500,000 to £100,000. The claimants were residents who used the existing service and would be affected by the reduction.

At a rolled-up hearing, they challenged the council's resolutions of 18 December 2008 and 12 February 2009. The principal issue was whether the council had given due regard to its duties under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1976. They also alleged that the council had failed to conduct an equality impact assessment and to consider the reduction's effects, contractual liabilities and an anticipated gap in services.

1. The claim succeeded and both funding decisions were quashed. The council had considered equality and social inclusion in general terms. It had therefore given some regard to the statutory duties, but it had not given them the due regard required by the discrimination legislation.
2. The statutory duty was an unqualified precondition of valid decision-making. It required a conscious, rigorous and open-minded consideration of the specified equality objectives before the decision was taken. The question was one of substance rather than form, although an express reference to the statutory criteria was good practice and could provide evidence of substantive compliance. The court applied the approach in R (Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA (Civ) 141 and R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin).
3. The council had identified legitimate countervailing considerations. These included severe financial pressure, the discretionary character of the funded service, the continued availability of some in-house services, the effect of cuts across disadvantaged groups and the service's relative insulation from earlier reductions. The weight given to those matters belonged to the council, subject to irrationality review. They could not, however, substitute for prior consideration of the statutory equality objectives.
4. The council's generalised consideration did not differentiate between reductions of 50% and 80%. The working group had declined to recommend a budget because it lacked sufficient information. Nevertheless, the December resolution invited tenders across that range, and the February report selected the maximum reduction while recording no specific equal-opportunities implications relevant to it. General concern for equality was not equivalent to consciously addressing the statutory criteria in relation to the particular reduction selected.
5. A formal equality impact assessment was not itself legally required, and the challenges based on material considerations failed. The council had considered the service impact, redundancy and pension liabilities, loss of matched funding and the temporary service gap. Relief could not be refused on the ground that the same decision was inevitable. The resolutions were quashed insofar as they reduced the welfare rights and advice budget, and the matter required prompt reconsideration. Permission to appeal was refused.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Following an earlier direction for an expedited oral hearing, permission and the substantive claim were determined together at a rolled-up hearing. The court granted permission, upheld the principal equality-duty ground and quashed the relevant parts of the two resolutions. Permission to appeal was refused.