Land Securities Plc & Ors v Fladgate Fielder (A Firm)

The tort of abuse of process exists separately from malicious prosecution. It does not require proof of malice, want of reasonable and probable cause, or termination of the underlying proceedings. Its essential focus is whether legal process was used predominantly to obtain an object outside the scope of the remedy and whether damage resulted.

In planning cases, judicial review provides public-law protection for affected property interests. A neighbouring owner may use that process to protect the value and enjoyment of its property, even where its conduct is commercially motivated and includes negotiations for financial or practical assistance. A collateral purpose is not improper merely because the desired benefit is unavailable as a formal judicial review remedy, provided it is reasonably related to redress for the grievance.

The claimants sought approximately £17 million in damages, alleging that the defendant solicitors had threatened and pursued judicial review proceedings against planning permissions to pressure them into assisting the defendant’s relocation and providing a financial benefit.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 3.4(2)(b), sought summary judgment under CPR Part 24, and requested determination of preliminary legal issues concerning the existence and scope of the tort. The central questions were whether abuse of process applied to judicial review and whether the defendant’s purpose was collateral or improper.

1. Summary judgment granted. The claimants had no realistic prospect of proving that the defendant’s predominant purpose in threatening and using judicial review was collateral or improper. Judgment was therefore entered for the defendant under CPR Part 24(2).
2. The tort of abuse of process remains part of English law, as formulated in Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing (N.C.) 211 and discussed in Metall & Rohstoff A.G. v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391. It is distinct from malicious prosecution. The claimant need not prove malice, want of reasonable and probable cause, or favourable termination of the underlying proceedings.
3. The court declined to define exhaustively whether the tort is confined to ancillary process or requires extortion, oppression or pressure. Those limitations were arguable but could not justify striking out the pleaded claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a).
4. The tort may apply to judicial review. The planning system supplies public-law protection for property interests affected by development, including access to representations and judicial review. A neighbouring owner need not act from a high-minded concern for planning policy.
5. A commercially motivated attempt to negotiate relocation assistance or compensation is not necessarily collateral or improper. The relevant question is whether the desired result is reasonably related to redress for the grievance. Here, the connection between the Wilton Plaza affordable-housing resolution and the Park House development meant that the defendant’s challenge was directed to protecting its premises and business interests.
6. The separate Henderson v Henderson abuse argument failed. The permission stage in judicial review did not provide a proper opportunity to determine contested factual and legal issues concerning abuse, and the claimants could not have advanced a damages counterclaim in those proceedings.