Lord-Castle v Director of Public Prosecutions

A vehicle is “used for ambulance purposes” if it is used, or primarily used, for conveying sick, injured or disabled persons. The question is one of fact and degree. The court may consider the vehicle’s actual use, its construction or adaptation, its previous use, its medical equipment and the expertise of its personnel. None of those factors is necessarily determinative. A vehicle need not itself be an ambulance. However, preserving an accident scene, giving first aid or caring for an injured person pending the arrival of paramedics does not, without more, constitute use for ambulance purposes. Where the prosecution has established the offence subject to a statutory exception, the defendant bears the burden of proving the exception on the balance of probabilities.

Michael Lord-Castle appealed by way of case stated from his conviction at Aldershot Magistrates’ Court on a charge of using a motor vehicle fitted with a siren, contrary to regulation 37(4) of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use Regulations) 1986 and section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Regulation 37(5) exempted vehicles used for ambulance purposes.

He had been acquitted of a separate charge concerning a blue warning beacon. The magistrates’ court found that he had not proved that his BMW was used for ambulance purposes. The Divisional Court considered the correct legal test, the rejection of a submission of no case to answer, an adverse inference from the appellant’s failure to give evidence, factual findings concerning defence witnesses and the costs order.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court nevertheless granted the appellant a defendant’s costs order because he succeeded on the most significant legal issue.
2. Regulation 37(5) of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use Regulations 1986 imposed an exception to regulation 37(4), and section 101 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1981 placed on the defendant the burden of proving the exception on the balance of probabilities.
3. The correct test was whether the vehicle was used, or primarily used, for conveying sick, injured or disabled persons. It was unnecessary to define “ambulance” or to require that the vehicle itself be an ambulance. The statutory definitions in the 1986 Regulations and the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 supported that approach.
4. Whether a vehicle was used for ambulance purposes was a question of fact and degree. Relevant considerations included actual carriage of sick, injured or disabled persons, capability resulting from construction or adaptation, frequency and dates of previous use, medical equipment and the expertise of personnel. Actual carriage was not determinative: DPP v Hawkins [1996] RTR 160 made that clear.
5. The magistrates had adopted an erroneous definition by treating stretcher-carrying capability, stabilisation equipment, suitably qualified personnel and advanced driving skills as legal requirements. Nevertheless, on the evidence, the same conclusion was inevitable under the correct test. The submission of no case to answer was therefore rightly rejected.
6. The magistrates were entitled to draw an adverse inference under section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, provided the conviction was not based wholly or mainly on that inference. Their treatment of the interview as a mixed statement was also proper: R v Aziz [1996] 1 AC 41.
7. The remaining challenges concerned findings of fact or the exercise of discretion. The magistrates were entitled to reject defence evidence, rely on the interview and absence of a stretcher, and make the costs order. No error of law or Wednesbury unreasonableness was shown.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of case stated dismissed. The conviction and costs order were upheld, subject to a defendant’s costs order in the appeal.
2. Aldershot Magistrates’ Court: the appellant was convicted on 1 February 2008 of the siren charge and acquitted of the beacon charge.