Director of Public Prosecutions v Issler & Anor

The exemption for vehicles used for ambulance purposes is concerned with the vehicle’s sole or primary use, assessed as a question of fact and degree. The vehicle must be capable of conveying sick, injured or disabled persons, and do so with sufficient frequency for that activity fairly to be described as its primary use. A vehicle whose core activity is carrying trained medical personnel to an emergency scene does not qualify merely because it may exceptionally convey an injured person. The court must apply the statutory language rather than broaden the exemption through an overly purposive construction. Any extension to cover modern first-responder vehicles is a matter for Parliament and the Secretary of State.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the dismissal of informations against Michael Issler and Mordechai Bamberger at Bury Magistrates’ Court. Each respondent had driven a privately owned vehicle equipped with a siren and blue warning lights to a road accident as a Hatzola first responder. The vehicles carried medical equipment and trained paramedics, but were not designed or adapted principally to convey casualties. The District Judge held that conveying trained personnel to an emergency scene was an ambulance purpose and dismissed the charges.

The appeal concerned the meaning of “ambulance purposes” in the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 and the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989, and the proper application of Lord-Castle v DPP [2009] EWHC 87 (Admin).

1. Appeal allowed. The answers to the stated questions were negative. The matter was remitted to Bury Magistrates’ Court with a direction to convict.

2. The court treated Lord-Castle v DPP [2009] EWHC 87 (Admin) as governing. Its test is fact-sensitive and asks whether the vehicle is used, or primarily used, for conveying sick, injured or disabled persons. The inquiry concerns the vehicle’s ordinary core activity, not simply what it was doing on the particular occasion. Relevant evidence may include the vehicle’s construction or adaptation, its actual use, the frequency of past conveyance, its equipment and the expertise of its personnel.

3. The phrase “ambulance purposes” is not synonymous with the separate regulatory definition of an ambulance. Nevertheless, the vehicle must at least be capable of conveying sick, injured or disabled persons, and must do so with sufficient frequency for that activity fairly to be designated its primary use. Carrying trained paramedics to an accident scene, even where exceptional conveyance of an injured person occurs, does not satisfy the test.

4. The court rejected a two-stage approach based first on the vehicle’s use on the particular occasion. That approach conflicted with the focus on the vehicle’s attributes and primary use. DPP v Hawkins [1996] RTR 160 supported the distinction between the vehicle’s general use and its use on a particular occasion.

5. The court was reluctant to reach the result because Hatzola was responsible, professionally organised and potentially life-saving. But the statutory wording could not properly be expanded by judicial construction. Any reform to include NHS first-responder vehicles and organisations such as Hatzola was for Parliament and the Secretary of State.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the DPP’s appeal by case stated against the dismissal of the informations. The case was remitted to Bury Magistrates’ Court with a direction to convict.
• Bury Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Richardson dismissed the informations on 2 October 2013, holding that the respondents’ vehicles were being used for ambulance purposes.