Virdi v The Law Society

A disciplinary tribunal may use its clerk for administrative assistance, including recording deliberations and preparing draft findings, provided that the tribunal itself makes the decision and controls the reasons. Employment of the clerk by the prosecuting professional body does not of itself create apparent bias where the tribunal and clerk are functionally independent. A substantial delay in delivering written findings may violate Article 6, even where no specific prejudice is shown, but a remedy beyond a formal declaration is not required where the penalty remains appropriate and the delay caused no significant disadvantage. The High Court gives considerable respect to an expert disciplinary tribunal’s sentence and interferes only where it is clearly inappropriate.

The claimant appealed to the Divisional Court against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s findings that he was guilty of five offences involving inadequate supervision, suspicious transactions, money-laundering procedures and permitting a solicitor to practise without a practising certificate. The tribunal had imposed a three-year suspension.

The appeal challenged the tribunal clerk’s participation in deliberations and preparation of written findings, alleged apparent bias arising from the clerk’s employment by the Law Society, the delay in producing detailed reasons, evidential rulings, the finding that Mr Bamrah was employed by the firm, and the sentence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The tribunal’s decision was made by its members on 26 October 2007. The clerk took no part in the decision-making process. Under rule 31(a) of the 1994 Rules, the tribunal could regulate its own procedure, which permitted the clerk’s administrative assistance and preparation of draft findings. The later 2007 Rules confirmed that such functions were proper.
2. The tribunal was independent of the Law Society. The clerk’s technical employment by the Law Society did not create a real possibility of bias. The clerk was not a decision-maker and nothing she did was improper. Pine v The Law Society, Holder v The Law Society, Rosen v The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and Whitefield v General Medical Council supported that conclusion. The Hong Kong authorities were distinguishable because they involved clerk participation in decision-making.
3. The nearly year-long delay in producing the detailed findings was inordinate and inexcusable and violated Article 6’s reasonable-time requirement. Under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the appropriate remedy was a formal statement of violation. The suspension was not shortened because that would undermine the proper disciplinary penalty where the delay caused no significant prejudice.
4. The tribunal was entitled to admit and rely on the fraud analyst’s evidence. The missing files did not cause significant prejudice. The findings that Mr Bamrah was employed by the firm were open on the facts, so it was unnecessary to determine the wider scope of section 1(a) of the Solicitors Act 1974.
5. The three-year suspension was not clearly inappropriate. The High Court therefore deferred to the tribunal’s expert assessment. The Law Society received the costs of the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay £5,000 to the intervening tribunal for the unnecessary interlocutory application, reflecting his success on the Article 6 point.

• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: On 26 October 2007, found five allegations proved and suspended the claimant from practice for three years. Detailed findings were delivered on 13 October 2008.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed. The court declared that the delay violated Article 6 but granted no further substantive remedy.