Chadwick v Hollingsworth

Under the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000, an appeal from a county court ordinarily lies to the High Court. The Court of Appeal route applies only where the decision is final in a Part 7 claim allocated to the multi-track. Finality depends on whether the decision would finally determine the entire proceedings, subject to any appeal or detailed assessment of costs. Permission to amend a statement of case is not final merely because refusal might lead to a further order. The Destination Order is secondary legislation capable of limiting the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction.

The claimant brought negligence proceedings concerning the management of an infected knee replacement. After his original expert changed his opinion, permission was granted to rely on replacement expert evidence. The claimant then applied to amend his particulars of claim.

On 8 January 2010, the Central London County Court granted permission to amend, subject to payment of the costs of the action to that date, and granted permission to appeal. Before considering the merits, the Court of Appeal addressed whether the order was final and whether the appeal lay to that court or to the High Court.

Moore-Bick LJ gave the leading judgment. Patten and Rix LJJ agreed.

1. Disposition. The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The matter was remitted to the High Court.
2. The Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000 prescribes the routes of appeal. In broad terms, an appeal from a county court lies to the High Court, except where the decision is a final decision in a Part 7 claim allocated to the multi-track and therefore lies to the Court of Appeal.
3. A final decision under article 1(2)(c) is one that would finally determine the entire proceedings, subject to any possible appeal or detailed assessment of costs, whichever way the issues were decided. An application for permission to amend particulars of claim cannot itself meet that definition. Granting permission leaves the proceedings continuing, and refusal would not itself determine them, even though it might lead to a later order having that effect.
4. The practice direction supplementing Part 52 identifies case-management decisions, including an order striking out a statement of case, as non-final for these purposes. Accordingly, even an order striking out the claim in its entirety would not have been a final order under the relevant route-of-appeal provisions.
5. The argument that the Destination Order was merely directory was rejected. The order was secondary legislation made under statutory powers. Section 56 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 empowered the Lord Chancellor to direct that appeals otherwise lying to the Court of Appeal should lie to another court. Articles 2, 3 and 4 therefore constituted an exclusive modification of the Court of Appeal’s statutory jurisdiction.
6. The court also stressed the procedural importance of rule 40.2(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. An order made when permission to appeal is sought should state whether it is final, the proper appeal court, whether permission is granted, and, if permission is refused, the court to which a further application should be made.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2010] EWCA Civ 1210, held that it lacked jurisdiction and remitted the matter to the High Court.
2. Central London County Court: On 8 January 2010, granted permission to amend the particulars of claim subject to a costs condition and granted permission to appeal.