Heseltine, R (on the application of) v Coroner's Office

Under section 8(3) of the Coroners Act 1988, a coroner must summon a jury where material before him provides a reason to suspect poisoning or circumstances whose recurrence could prejudice public health or safety. The threshold requires some hard, independent evidence supporting an objective possibility. Personal suspicion, general concern about hospital accidents, or the absence of further testing is insufficient. The coroner retains a separate discretion to summon a jury where any reason for doing so appears.

Mr Jeffrey Heseltine sought judicial review of decisions made by the coroner during an inquest into his wife's death. He disputed the medical conclusion that she had died from cancer and alleged poisoning or negligent medical treatment. The application was refused on the papers by Mr Rabinder Singh QC and, after renewal, by Wyn Williams J in the Administrative Court. Sir Scott Baker refused permission to appeal on the papers.

By the renewed application before the Court of Appeal, the coroner had completed the inquest without a jury and recorded a verdict of death from natural causes. The central issues were whether the coroner had been obliged to summon a jury and whether alleged defects concerning evidence and procedure justified judicial review.

Application refused. Lord Justice Sedley considered the renewed application for permission to appeal against the Administrative Court's refusal to permit judicial review proceedings to continue. Although the claim appeared to be substantially out of time, the court proceeded on the merits because no limitation point had been taken below.

1. Section 8(3) of the Coroners Act 1988 required the coroner to summon a jury if it seemed that there was reason to suspect, among other matters, that the death had been caused by poisoning or had occurred in circumstances whose possible recurrence could prejudice the health or safety of the public or a section of the public. People treated in NHS hospitals could constitute such a section of the public.
2. The statutory threshold was suspicion, not proof. It nevertheless required material before the coroner providing some hard, independent evidence of an objective possibility of poisoning or negligent treatment. General concern about medical accidents did not make it more likely that this particular death had resulted from one. The unsupported suspicions of the deceased's husband, together with the fact that no bone biopsy had been undertaken, did not satisfy the threshold. The reports of all three pathologists supported cancer as the cause of death and did not provide evidence of aluminium poisoning.
3. The coroner also possessed a separate discretion to summon a jury where any reason for doing so appeared. The material disclosed no obvious case in which that discretion had to be exercised.
4. Reading the evidence of an unavailable witness was appropriate, particularly as an adjournment had been offered. An alleged drugs chart which had not been shown to the appellant could not establish an arguable procedural case without evidence of its contents or of its capacity to fill the evidential gap.

Permission to appeal was refused. The concerns, though understandable, did not disclose a viable legal challenge.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Lord Justice Sedley refused the renewed application for permission to appeal, holding that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success: [2010] EWCA Civ 267.
2. Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court — Wyn Williams J refused the renewed application for judicial review.
3. Earlier decisions — Mr Rabinder Singh QC rejected the application on the papers. Sir Scott Baker subsequently found on the papers that there was no prospect of a successful appeal.