Bradley Fold Travel Ltd & Anor v Secretary of State for Transport

An appeal from a specialist tribunal is not a rehearing on fresh factual territory. The appellant bears the burden of showing that the decision below is wrong. It is insufficient to show that another view is reasonable or possible; objective grounds must demonstrate that a different view is the right one, or that reason and the law require it.

Where the first-instance decision-maker heard the evidence and assessed credibility, an appellate tribunal must recognise that advantage. It may interfere where the reasoning process or application of law requires a different conclusion. On a further appeal confined to questions of law, this court will not revisit factual or evaluative conclusions that were open to the tribunal. In operator-licensing proceedings, revocation is justified where the conduct, assessed in the round, is such that the operator ought to be put out of business.

Bradley Fold Travel Ltd held a public service vehicle operator’s licence, and Peter Wright was its director and transport manager. Following an earlier remittal for rehearing, the Deputy Traffic Commissioner investigated maintenance failures, breaches of undertakings, tachograph irregularities and drivers’ hours issues.

The Deputy Commissioner revoked the licence under the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 and disqualified Mr Wright from holding an operator’s licence for 18 months. The Transport Tribunal upheld the substance of that decision, while correcting or qualifying some findings. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal on alleged errors in the tribunal’s appellate approach, factual assessment, treatment of later criminal proceedings and sanction. The central issue was whether the tribunal had applied the correct scope and standard of appellate review and whether any error of law justified intervention.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Transport Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of fact and law did not make the appeal a second first-instance hearing. The tribunal ordinarily had the documentary material and transcript, but not the Deputy Commissioner’s direct advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses and assessing credibility.
2. The correct appellate approach was that stated in Biogen Inc v Medeva Ltd and Assicurzioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group: the greater the first-instance decision-maker’s advantage, the more reluctant an appellate body should be to interfere with primary findings. Evaluative conclusions involve the weighing of several factors, and different decision-makers may legitimately differ.
3. Applying Subesh & ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the appellant had to show more than that a different view was reasonable or possible. The appellant had to identify objective grounds demonstrating that the different view was the right one, because the reasoning process or application of law required it. That approach applied equally to appeals from a Traffic Commissioner to the Transport Tribunal.
4. The Court of Appeal’s own jurisdiction was narrower. Under Schedule 4 to the Transport Act 1985, the appeal was confined to a point of law. The court could draw necessary inferences and make appropriate orders, but could not intervene merely because it preferred another factual or evaluative conclusion.
5. The tribunal was entitled to uphold the material findings despite correcting the finding concerning use of a vehicle after expiry of its MOT and qualifying the finding about the outside contractor. The remaining evidence supported findings of serious maintenance failures, breach of undertakings, unreliable tachograph records and risk to road users. Later acquittal in criminal proceedings did not invalidate the administrative findings, which were based on the evidence before the Commissioner, concerned a different standard of proof, and covered matters beyond the criminal charges.
6. Following Crompton (t/a David Crompton Haulage) v Department of Transport and the approach in Bryan Haulage (No 2), the question was whether the conduct was so serious that the operator ought to be put out of business. The Commissioner and Tribunal were entitled to assess the case in the round, including the appellants’ history, the earlier tarnishing of reputation, and the serious and numerous failures to comply with the licensing regime and undertakings. Revocation and 18 months’ disqualification were neither disproportionate nor excessive.

Lord Justice Sedley and Lady Justice Smith agreed with Lord Justice Leveson’s judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court dismissed the appeal and found no error of law in the Transport Tribunal’s approach or conclusion.
• Transport Tribunal: Following an earlier successful appeal and remittal for rehearing, the Deputy Traffic Commissioner revoked the operator’s licence and disqualified Peter Wright for 18 months. The Transport Tribunal upheld the outcome, while correcting or qualifying certain findings.
• Deputy Traffic Commissioner: After a further public inquiry, the Commissioner found that the operator and Mr Wright no longer satisfied the good-repute requirements and that licence undertakings had not been fulfilled.