Terrain Construction Group Limited v Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency

On an appeal against a Traffic Commissioner’s decision under the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001, the Upper Tribunal must decide whether the Commissioner’s determination was legally flawed or plainly wrong. Where refusal rests on alternative grounds, the appellant must establish that every sufficient ground fails. The Tribunal will generally assess the decision on the evidence available below and will not admit new evidence merely because a party failed to attend the original hearing and thereby lost the opportunity to explain or defend its written case. The impounding regime is itself proportionate, so the Tribunal has no additional residual power to set aside a decision for unfairness or disproportionality.

Terrain Construction Group Limited appealed under regulation 13 of the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 against a Traffic Commissioner’s refusal to return a detained vehicle. The vehicle had been detained under regulation 3, and the application had been made under regulation 10.

The Commissioner gave three alternative reasons: the application was invalid because it was not signed by a director; the appellant had not shown that it was the lawful owner when the vehicle was detained; and it had not established the regulation 4(3)(c) ground that it did not know the vehicle was being used without an operator’s licence. The appellant had submitted written evidence but had not attended the Commissioner’s hearing. The central issues were whether the factual findings were legally flawed or plainly wrong and whether further evidence should be admitted on appeal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant had to show that all three alternative reasons for refusal were affected by material legal error or were otherwise plainly wrong. Two reasons were independently sufficient.

2. Under the approach in Bradley Fold Travel Ltd & anor v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695, the Upper Tribunal asks whether objective grounds establish that a different view from that of the Traffic Commissioner is the right one, or that reason and the law compel a different view.

3. The finding that the appellant had not shown lawful ownership was neither legally flawed nor plainly wrong. The evidence before the Commissioner was an invoice recording an outstanding purchase price. The appellant’s later letter stating that the vehicle had been paid for in full was new evidence and was not admitted.

4. The finding concerning knowledge was also sound. The appellant’s written account that it had left the vehicle with a commercial trader to sell or return raised obvious unanswered questions, including the trader’s identity and the unexplained three-year period. The Commissioner was entitled to attach little weight to that evidence and to conclude that regulation 4(3)(c) was not established.

5. It was not fair or just to admit evidence and explanations which the appellant could have given at the Commissioner’s hearing but chose not to provide. The appellant had thereby declined the opportunity to have its written case tested and clarified. The Tribunal did not need to decide the alternative signature reasoning, although it considered that reasoning more difficult.

6. The Tribunal had no residual power to set aside the determination for unfairness or disproportionality because the impounding regime was itself proportionate, as explained in Bolle Materieel BV v DVSA [2016] UKUT 0398 (AAC).

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): appeal dismissed. The Tribunal upheld the Traffic Commissioner’s refusal because two alternative factual grounds were not legally flawed or plainly wrong.
• Traffic Commissioner: following a hearing on 28 August 2025, Mr Dorrington refused the application for return of the vehicle by decision dated 8 September 2025.