C & Anor, R (on the application of) v Nottingham City Council

Judicial review should not continue where a public authority has made irrevocable offers providing, in practical terms, all the relief sought. The alternative resolution need not reproduce every function of judicial review. It is sufficient that a significant part of the dispute can be resolved outside litigation, absent good reason to proceed. Parties have a heavy obligation to litigate only where litigation is really unavoidable. The Court of Appeal will not determine moot points merely because the answer may affect other cases.

The appellants sought judicial review of Nottingham City Council’s refusal to treat them as former relevant children under the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Leaving Care) (England) Regulations 2001. They argued that accommodation arranged by the Housing Department should have been provided under section 20 of the Children Act rather than under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. That classification would have entitled them to leaving-care services and, for the second appellant, housing priority status.

HHJ Inglis refused permission to proceed, applying the reasoning of R (M) v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [2008] UKHL 14; [2008] 1 WLR 535. The Court of Appeal directed a rolled-up hearing. The council renewed offers of the requested services and housing priority. The preliminary questions were whether the proceedings served any useful purpose and whether they were out of time.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Jackson delivered the judgment, with the Chancellor and Lord Justice Rimer agreeing. The Court refused permission to proceed with the substantive judicial review claim and dismissed the appeal.
2. Utility of the proceedings. The council had offered in writing, and repeated in court, the complete package of services sought under the Children (Leaving Care) (England) Regulations 2001. It had also offered the second appellant priority housing status until age 21. The offers were treated as irrevocable until each appellant reached that age. The appellants had therefore obtained, in practical terms, all remedies they required, so the litigation served no useful purpose.
3. Alternative resolution. The court applied Cowl v Plymouth City Council (Practice Note) [2001] EWCA Civ 1935; [2002] 1 WLR 803. Under that approach, parties have no right to insist on judicial review where a significant part of the dispute can be resolved outside litigation. Proceedings should not continue without good reason, and lawyers have a heavy obligation to litigate only where it is really unavoidable.
4. Moot issues. The appellants’ submission that a ruling would have wider implications did not justify proceeding. The Court of Appeal does not exist to decide moot points, and public resources should not be spent resolving issues with no continuing relevance to the parties before the court. The court consequently did not determine whether the accommodation had been provided under the Children Act or the homelessness provisions of Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.
5. Time. The limitation issue did not arise. Lord Justice Jackson stated that, if it had arisen in proceedings genuinely concerning the welfare of the vulnerable young adults, he would have been minded to extend time. That observation was unnecessary to the decision.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Following a rolled-up hearing, refused permission to proceed with the judicial review claim and dismissed the appeal: [2010] EWCA Civ 790.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: HHJ Inglis refused permission to proceed, holding that the appellants had not been looked after by the Children’s Services Department and applying R (M) v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [2008] UKHL 14; [2008] 1 WLR 535.