VP (Italy) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under regulation 21(4) of the European Economic Area Regulations 2006, imperative grounds of public security require a very high threshold. There must be an actual risk to public security that is sufficiently compelling to justify the exceptional expulsion of an EEA national integrated through many years’ residence. The seriousness of an offence, a custodial sentence, or a general risk of reoffending is not enough alone; something more in scale or kind is required. A tribunal’s use of stronger terms such as essential or vital is unhelpful, but does not invalidate its decision where the substantive approach and conclusion are correct.

The appellant, an Italian national resident in the United Kingdom since 1986, was subject to deportation on public security grounds after conviction for attempted murder and a nine-year sentence. Immigration Judge Dawson allowed the appeal in September 2007, applying the highest protection level under regulation 21(4). SIJ Taylor confirmed the decision on reconsideration in May 2008. The appeal concerned whether the tribunal had set the imperative threshold too high and had failed to take account of the Secretary of State’s role. The central issue was the correct meaning and application of imperative grounds of public security.

1. Outcome. The appeal was dismissed. The court applied the highest level of protection under regulation 21(4) of the European Economic Area Regulations 2006, which had been applied by concession.
2. Applicable threshold. The guidance in LG (Italy) [2008] EWCA Civ 190 and on remittal in LG (Italy) [2009] UKAIT 00024 was accepted as an accurate statement of the law. Public security is broader than national security. Imperative grounds connote a very high threshold and require an actual risk to public security so compelling that the exceptional expulsion of a person integrated through many years’ residence is justified. This is a qualitative distinction from the lower protection levels.
3. Insufficient factors. The seriousness of the offence, the custodial sentence, or an ordinary risk of further offending does not by itself establish imperative grounds. A serious offence may be the starting point, but something more in scale or kind is required. Terrorism and threats to national security are examples, but sufficiently serious serial or targeted criminality may also qualify.
4. Application. Immigration Judge Dawson’s use of terms such as essential, vital and no option but removal was an unhelpful gloss, but it did not affect the substance of the decision. The finding that the person concerned presented a low risk of reoffending and a medium risk of harm in a relationship did not demonstrate the compelling threat required by regulation 21(4). The Secretary of State’s decision letter gave no explanation for treating the case as imperative, so the tribunal could not be criticised for failing to give weight to reasoning that was absent.
5. Further material. The opinion of Advocate General Bot in Tsakouridis v Land Baden-Wurttemburg [2010] Case C-145/09 did not require qualification of the guidance. Up-to-date evidence about the person’s circumstances was not relevant to the legality of the decision under review, although it reinforced the view that deportation would be disproportionate if the case were remitted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The appeal was dismissed: [2010] EWCA Civ 806.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. Immigration Judge Dawson allowed the appeal against the deportation decision in September 2007. SIJ Taylor confirmed that decision on reconsideration in May 2008.