Thakrar & Anor v R. (Rev 1)

Multiple hearsay evidence of an alleged confession may be admitted under section 121(1)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where its value, assessed with its apparent reliability, is sufficiently high that the interests of justice require admission. Detailed information consistent with unchallenged evidence and apparently known only to an eyewitness may strongly support both value and reliability.

A confession which also implicates a co-defendant need not be excluded merely because it is not an admission against that co-defendant. Its reliability may extend to that implication where there is no rational basis for the confessor falsely to name an innocent accomplice. A special jury direction is unnecessary where the circumstances provide no realistic basis for blame-shifting.

The appellants were convicted at St Albans Crown Court before Cooke J of three murders, two attempted murders and possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. The prosecution had adduced written statements from three Northern Cypriot witnesses. The statements recounted admissions by Miran Thakrar that he committed the offences with his brother.

The witnesses would not give oral evidence in England. The trial judge admitted their statements as multiple hearsay. On appeal, the appellants challenged that ruling and relied on later retractions by the witnesses. The court also received fresh oral evidence from Burhan Durgun by Skype link. Kevan Thakrar further contended that the reference to a “brother” might mean a close friend, and that the jury required a special direction.

1. The appeals were dismissed. The court had no lurking doubt about the safety of either conviction.

2. The judge had dealt impeccably with the hearsay application. The three statements were admissible under section 121(1)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Their evidential value was considerable and the judge was entitled to regard them as reliable. In particular, they contained details, including the use of the firearm to strike a victim and the killing of the dog, which were consistent with unchallenged evidence and could only have been known to an eyewitness. There was no evidential basis for supposing that those details had been supplied by the English police or fabricated by the Northern Cypriot police.

3. The judge was also entitled to reject exclusion. The makers had no apparent motive to invent the confessions, and Officer Günay’s convincing account of the taking of the statements was accepted. The court would itself have admitted the evidence.

4. The implication of Kevan Thakrar was not unfairly admitted. If Miran Thakrar had made the confession or boast described, there was no reason to think that he would falsely identify his brother if another person had been his accomplice. That part of the confession was therefore as reliable and valuable as the part implicating Miran. Joinder was plainly appropriate.

5. The fresh retraction evidence was rejected as incredible. Durgun’s evidence was internally contradictory and the court found that he was manifestly lying when he denied the earlier statements. Officer Günay’s evidence confirmed that the original statements, including the confessions, were made voluntarily.

6. No special direction was required concerning the reference to a brother. This was not an attempt by a defendant to reduce his own responsibility by blaming another. It was an alleged boast describing joint participation. The suggested Turkish ambiguity did not assist because the confession was made in English, and other evidence independently supported Kevan’s participation.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appellants’ conviction appeals were dismissed: [2010] EWCA Crim 1505.
• Crown Court at St Albans: Before Cooke J and a jury, both appellants were convicted of three murders, two attempted murders and possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life.