Lewis, R. v

Where a victim dies while fleeing an unlawful act, the prosecution must prove both factual causation and a legally foreseeable response. The unlawful act must have caused the flight and death on a but for basis. The victim’s escape must also fall within the range of responses reasonably to be expected in the circumstances, rather than being an independent voluntary act which breaks the chain of causation.

A jury direction is sufficient if it requires the jury to be sure that the victim was running away as a result of the defendant’s unlawful chase. A separate direction framed by reference to the victim’s awareness is unnecessary where the direction already captures that causal requirement.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter at Birmingham Crown Court after Christopher Gray ran into the road and was fatally struck by a car during an altercation involving the appellant.

The prosecution case was that the appellant chased Gray after a confrontation with a group of students. The appellant denied a chase and said that Gray had run away after striking him. The central issue was whether Gray’s flight and death were caused by an unlawful assault or attempted battery constituted by the chase, or whether Gray acted independently.

The appellant challenged the adequacy of the jury directions on causation and intervening acts. He also sought leave to advance grounds concerning attempted battery and alternative verdicts.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge’s written route to verdict adequately directed the jury on the essential causal issue. The jury could convict only if sure that Gray was running away as a result of the appellant’s unlawful chase.

2. In a death-during-flight case, causation has two requirements. First, there must be cause and effect: but for the unlawful act, the flight and death would not have occurred. Secondly, the flight must be a foreseeable consequence of that act. It must not be so irrational or voluntary that it amounts to an intervening act breaking the chain of causation.

3. The direction requiring the jury to decide whether Gray was running away as a result of the unlawful chase necessarily required a causal connection. It was therefore unnecessary to repeat the issue in negative form by directing expressly that acquittal followed if Gray was unaware that he was being chased. The later definition of chase as pursuit with a view to catching removed any possible ambiguity.

4. The judge’s direction that Gray’s running must be within the range of responses that might be expected from a person in his situation sufficiently addressed reasonable foreseeability and novus actus interveniens. Although the judge could have used language such as proportionality or a daft response, the ordinary language used required the jury to compare the threatened conduct with Gray’s form of escape.

5. The renewed grounds added nothing. Attempted battery did not itself require Gray’s awareness of violence, but the required causal finding still required the jury to be sure that the chase caused his flight. Nor was there an arguable need to leave summary alternatives of assault or attempted battery: on the facts they were trivial absent foresight of harm, and there was no realistic possibility that the jury convicted of manslaughter merely because no alternative was available.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2010] EWCA Crim 151.
• Birmingham Crown Court — convicted the appellant of manslaughter on 28 September 2005 following trial before Judge Matthews and a jury.