R. v Ul-Haq

Evidence of a non-defendant’s bad character is not admissible merely because credibility or alleged violence is an important issue. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 100, it must have substantive probative value on that issue and substantial importance in the case as a whole. Old, unrelated convictions lacking similarity to the alleged conduct may properly be excluded, particularly where other allegations would create satellite litigation.

A summing-up is assessed as a whole. A judge need not repeat every factual argument where the directions and review fairly enable the jury to determine the disputes. Although a jury should not normally receive further evidence after retiring, an error in allowing it will not make a conviction unsafe without prejudice.

The appellant was convicted at Bradford Crown Court, after a six-week jury trial, of the murder of Billy Khan. He admitted inflicting the fatal stab wound but relied on defence of his brother and, alternatively, provocation.

With leave of the single judge, he appealed on four extant grounds. He challenged the exclusion of Yusuf Khan’s previous convictions and other alleged misconduct under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. He also alleged that the summing-up and subsequent redirection were unfair, and that the jury should not have been permitted, after retiring, to hear recordings of emergency calls of which they had received transcripts.

The central question was whether any of those rulings or directions, separately or cumulatively, rendered the murder conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. None of the four grounds, whether considered individually or together, rendered the conviction unsafe.

2. The trial judge correctly excluded Yusuf Khan’s past convictions and other alleged misconduct. Under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the material was not important explanatory evidence. Although Yusuf’s credibility, and arguably his alleged aggression, were important issues, the historic convictions had no substantive probative value on either his truthfulness or his conduct during the fatal incident. They were unrelated to the case, remote in time and dissimilar. The unproved allegations had no probative value and would have caused satellite litigation.

3. The summing-up, read as a whole, was fair. The judge properly reminded the jury that evidence was disputed, that his review was not a transcript, and that matters omitted from it could be discussed by the jury. A fuller identification of the defence case might have been preferable, but the judge referred to the material concerning Mohammed Farooq’s injured finger and blood on Yusuf Khan’s trainers. He was not obliged to rehearse defence counsel’s factual arguments. There were no material omissions capable of making the conviction unsafe.

4. The judge’s repeated directions on provocation and lawful and unlawful killing accurately repeated his original directions. No objection had been made when either direction was given.

5. The court considered R v Riaz and Burke [1992] 94 Cr App R 339. A jury should ordinarily receive no further evidence after retiring, although in an appropriate case it may hear original recordings in court, with safeguards. The court doubted whether allowing these recordings to be played was correct, since they had little additional probative value and could not evidence the appellant’s state of mind. However, the firm direction confined the jury’s use of the calls to the callers’ states of mind. The appellant suffered no prejudice, so the conviction remained safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the appeal against conviction for murder was dismissed: [2010] EWCA Crim 1683.
• Bradford Crown Court: on 4 June 2009, following a jury trial before the Recorder of Bradford, the appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 14 years, less time on remand. No lower-court citation was stated.