Evans, R. v

Evidence of previous convictions demonstrating a propensity may properly be admitted where the Crown case, taken cumulatively, is not weak. The trial judge’s assessment of fairness under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 carries particular weight on appeal.

An adverse-inference direction under section 34 may be given where an accused later relies on factual matters which could reasonably have been mentioned in interview. The direction should identify those matters with appropriate particularity. A sparse direction will not render a conviction unsafe unless the defect affects its safety.

Evans and Sabbagh-Parry were convicted at a re-trial in Ipswich Crown Court of conspiracy to supply Class A heroin. They had travelled from Liverpool to Ipswich in a hired car. Police stopped the car and later found a clean package containing heroin near the place where it had been stopped.

The Crown relied on the circumstances of the journey, the satellite-navigation device and the appellants’ previous drug-supply convictions. Both appellants appealed against the admission of the convictions and the section 34 adverse-inference directions. Evans also challenged the rejection of his submission of no case to answer.

1. The appeals were dismissed. The Crown evidence was capable of supporting the convictions. It was not confined to the discovery of drugs near the car and a journey towards a drugs hot spot. The jury could consider the opportunity to discard the package, its fresh appearance, the hired car’s repeated Liverpool-Ipswich journeys, the satellite-navigation evidence, and the appellants’ previous convictions. Circumstantial evidence may be compelling.
2. The convictions were properly admitted under section 111(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The court rejected the premise that this was a weak case merely bolstered by bad-character evidence. Following Renda & Others [2006] 2 All ER 553, the trial judge’s assessment of the case and of fairness under section 111(3) was of primary importance. There was no basis to interfere, and admission was fully justified.
3. A section 34 direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was available. The appellants could reasonably have been expected in interview to explain such matters as their intended destination, contacts and stay in Ipswich, their relationship with the other occupants, and the hiring and use of the car.
4. The judge should have identified more precisely the factual matters later relied on which ought to have been raised in interview, consistently with the standard direction approved in Condron [1997] 1 Cr App R 185. The direction was sparse, but any defect was far from capable of affecting the safety of the convictions.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Dismissed the appellants’ appeals against conviction.
• Ipswich Crown Court. At a re-trial, the appellants were convicted of conspiracy to supply Class A heroin and each received six years’ imprisonment, subject to credit for time spent on remand.