Salter, R v

On an appeal alleging inconsistent jury verdicts, the ultimate question is whether the convictions are safe. A logical inconsistency is necessary, but is not by itself sufficient, to show that a conviction is unsafe. A conviction may remain safe where the verdicts have a sensible explanation. The appellant bears the burden of establishing unsafety.

Jurors may accept part of a witness’s evidence while rejecting, or remaining unsure about, other parts. They may therefore reach different verdicts on separate counts where the evidence permits that course. Each case depends on its facts and no universal test can be formulated.

The appellant was convicted at Bristol Crown Court of eight counts of theft from his mother, and acquitted of nine other theft counts. He received an 18-month community order with 150 hours’ unpaid work.

The prosecution alleged that he had used his mother’s debit-card and Maestro-card details without authority to make payments for his benefit. His defence was that she had authorised the relevant payments, save that he denied knowledge of two groups of transactions.

With leave of the single judge, he appealed against conviction. His sole ground was that the mixed verdicts were logically inconsistent and could not be rationally understood.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant had not established that any conviction was unsafe.

2. The court applied the established approach to allegedly inconsistent verdicts. Safety is the governing statutory question. Logical inconsistency is necessary, but not sufficient, for a successful challenge. Even a logical inconsistency does not render a conviction unsafe if the verdicts can sensibly be explained. Only where there is no explanation may the court conclude that the jury was confused or adopted a wrong approach.

3. The verdicts required the jury to assess the credibility and reliability of the appellant and his mother. That assessment was primarily for the jury, which had heard and seen the witnesses. A jury is entitled to accept part of a witness’s evidence while rejecting, or not being sure about, other parts.

4. There was evidence supporting a differentiated assessment. The jury could conclude that the complainant may have forgotten some financial assistance given for relatively small payments connected with the appellant’s transport and council-tax needs. It could nevertheless be sure that she had not authorised payments for other items described as small luxuries.

5. The differing verdicts on the cricket-ticket and hotel counts did not demonstrate a logical inconsistency. The jury could be sure of the complainant’s evidence on one count but not sure of it on another. The careful directions to consider each count separately supported the conclusion that the jury had reached separate, permissible verdicts.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed: [2010] EWCA Crim 2429.
• Crown Court at Bristol: The appellant was convicted of eight theft counts and acquitted of nine. He was sentenced on 4 November 2009 to an 18-month community order with 150 hours’ unpaid work.