PR, R v

An admitted previous inconsistent statement is admissible under section 119(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as proof of its contents where the statutory conditions are met. A count need not be withdrawn merely because that statement conflicts with oral evidence. The issue is whether a properly directed rational jury could safely accept it.

Evidence from one complainant may support another only if the jury is sure that the complaints are genuinely independent. Discussions between family members do not automatically negate independence. Defects in directions or a summing-up do not render convictions unsafe unless, viewed in context, they created a real risk of prejudice or misunderstanding.

R v PR concerned convictions in the Crown Court at Manchester for sexual offences, including indecent assaults and incest, against the appellant’s two daughters. The appellant received a total sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the refusal to withdraw two specimen incest counts based on one complainant’s second witness statement. He also alleged deficiencies in the summing-up, including directions on cross-admissibility, special-measures evidence and the defence case. The central question was whether any of those matters rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed. The court granted leave to appeal but held that none of the matters raised affected the safety of any conviction.

2. The judge was entitled to leave counts 24 and 25 to the jury. The complainant had made and admitted a second statement that was materially inconsistent with aspects of her oral evidence. It was therefore admissible under section 119(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as evidence of the matters stated. The differences between her accounts did not make it unsafe for a rational jury, properly directed, to rely on the second statement. This was not a case for withdrawal under the second limb of R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124.

3. The direction on the evidential use of inconsistent statements could have been clearer and more specifically tailored. Nevertheless, it sufficiently conveyed that the jury could accept the second statement and act upon it. The judge’s abbreviated description of that statement caused no prejudice.

4. The cross-admissibility direction was proper. The jury had first to be sure that the two complaints were truly independent and unaffected by collusion or transfer of ideas. Family discussions did not necessarily preclude that conclusion. It was open to the jury to find independence and then assess the similarities and differences between the complaints.

5. Other shortcomings in the directions and the structure of the summing-up were regrettable but lacked practical significance. The defence case and the material relied on to support it were sufficiently placed before the jury.

6. Sentence appeal allowed in part. The concurrent three-year terms on counts 19 and 20 exceeded the applicable two-year maximum. They were reduced to two years’ imprisonment concurrent. The total sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was unaffected.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal was granted. The appeal against conviction was dismissed in R v PR [2010] EWCA Crim 2741. The appeal against sentence was allowed only to correct unlawful concurrent terms on counts 19 and 20.

• Crown Court at Manchester: The appellant was convicted by a jury on 24 counts of sexual offences involving his two daughters and sentenced to a total of 10 years’ imprisonment.