Roe, R v

Violent robbery in a victim’s home encompasses conduct of widely differing seriousness. Sentencing must therefore depend on an individual assessment rather than a general tariff. Home invasion, significant previous offending and repetition aggravate seriousness. At the lower end, comparison with prevailing sentences for street robbery may assist. At the serious end, that comparison may be unhelpful because the offending is strikingly dissimilar. A sentence at the top of the permissible range is not manifestly excessive merely because a lower sentence was available.

R v Roe appealed with leave against an imprisonment-for-public-protection sentence with a four-year minimum term, based on a notional determinate term of 12 years.

The offence was a joint robbery after the appellant and his co-accused entered the complainant’s flat. The complainant was threatened, moved around the flat, tied up and robbed. The appellant had relevant previous convictions, including an Irish conviction arising from similar home-invasion offending.

The sole remaining issue was whether the sentencing judge’s 12-year starting point after trial was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that the 12-year starting point was at the top of the available range, but remained within it. It was therefore not manifestly excessive.

2. Robbery in the home covers a very broad range of conduct. The Sentencing Guidelines Council had deliberately not prescribed a general guideline for violent personal robberies in the home. Sentencing judges must instead assess each case individually.

3. The invasion of a victim’s home, a significant criminal record and repeated offending are general aggravating features. At the lower end, a court may draw assistance from the relationship between sentences for home robbery and other robberies, as in Attorney General’s Reference Nos 38 to 40 of 2007 (Crummack and others) [2007] EWCA Crim. 1692. That comparison is not useful in serious cases involving markedly different violence, threats and terror.

4. This offence was far more serious than the limited-violence cases advanced for comparison. Although it was less grave than the extreme examples in R v O’Driscoll (1986) 8 Cr.App.R (S) 121 and Morris and Long, it amply justified a double-figure starting point. Its severity lay particularly in the sustained, terrifying impact on an unconnected victim in her own home.

5. There was also no basis to disturb the earlier conclusion that the appellant fell within the dangerous-offender provisions. The court refused time to seek a certificate because no point of law of general public importance arose.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the sentence appeal in [2010] EWCA Crim 357.

• Sentencing court: His Honour Judge Hillen imposed imprisonment for public protection with a four-year minimum term, based on a notional determinate term of 12 years. The court and citation are not stated in the judgment.