Morris & Anor, R v

For a dangerous offender, a life sentence is not justified merely because the offender presents a danger where an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection will adequately protect the public. Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 regime, life imprisonment should be reserved for offending of particularly high culpability or particular gravity.

In assessing exceptionally serious robberies, a court must preserve sentencing space for still graver cases. The fact that offenders carried weapons to terrorise victims, but did not use them to inflict physical injury, may mean that a life sentence and an excessive uplift above the relevant robbery range are not justified.

The appellants pleaded guilty to a series of robberies, aggravated burglaries and kidnapping committed during January 2009. Their offending involved masked home invasions, threats with knives and other weapons, violence, restraint of victims, theft, and grave and lasting psychological harm.

The sentencing judge imposed life sentences on the kidnapping, aggravated-burglary and most serious robbery counts. He set minimum periods of seven years and three months for Morris and eight years for Long. Both men accepted that they were dangerous offenders. Their appeals challenged the use of life sentences rather than imprisonment for public protection, and the length of the minimum periods.

1. The appeals were allowed to a limited extent. The life sentences on counts 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 were quashed. They were replaced by sentences of imprisonment for public protection. The concurrent determinate sentences on the remaining counts were maintained.

2. The appellants were dangerous, and the court gave full weight to the sustained, brutal and sadistic nature of the offending and its effects on the victims. However, dangerousness could be addressed by imprisonment for public protection. Such a sentence was indeterminate: release depended on satisfying the Parole Board that release was safe, and any licence remained subject to recall, potentially for life.

3. Applying the principle in Kehoe [2008] EWCA Crim 819, the court held that life imprisonment under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 should be reserved for cases of particularly high culpability or particular gravity. Although the appellants used weapons to threaten and terrify their victims, they did not use those weapons to inflict injury. The court had to leave room for still more serious cases in which weapons were used gratuitously or to cause more serious physical harm.

4. The court also reduced the minimum periods. The seriousness of the offences, the appellants’ poor antecedents, the number of offences, and the extreme terror inflicted justified starting points well above the 13-to-16-year guideline range for violent home robberies. But the original starting points went too far. The minimum periods were fixed at seven years and three months for Long and six years and eight months for Morris. They reflected determinate starting points, before guilty-plea credit, of 22 years for Long and 20 years for Morris.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the sentence appeals to a limited extent. It substituted imprisonment for public protection for the life sentences and reduced the minimum periods.
• Sentencing judge Imposed life sentences on the kidnapping, aggravated-burglary and most serious robbery counts, with specified minimum periods.