Kehoe,R. v

Where an offender satisfies the dangerousness criteria, imprisonment for public protection ordinarily supplies the required public protection. Under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a life sentence should therefore be reserved for an offence of particular gravity or an offender of particularly high culpability.

An unpremeditated killing committed while the offender’s responsibility was diminished and after legal provocation did not meet that threshold. The appropriate sentence was imprisonment for public protection, with a minimum term assessed by reference to the seriousness of the manslaughter and appropriate credit for a guilty plea.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to manslaughter after the prosecution accepted her plea of not guilty to murder on grounds of diminished responsibility. The killing followed offensive remarks which legally provoked her. She had serious mental disorder and alcohol dependence, and the judge found her dangerous.

The Recorder imposed life imprisonment and specified a minimum term of four years and six months, less time on remand. The appellant appealed against sentence. She challenged both the choice of a life sentence rather than imprisonment for public protection and the length of the minimum term.

1. Appeal allowed to the extent indicated. The life sentence was quashed and replaced with imprisonment for public protection. The minimum term was reduced to three years, less 427 days spent on remand.
2. Section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 required a life sentence only where the offender was dangerous, the offence otherwise carried life imprisonment, and its seriousness justified that sentence. In every other dangerous-offender case, the statutory sentence was imprisonment for public protection.
3. Once dangerousness was established, public protection no longer required a discretionary life sentence. The court held that life imprisonment should be reserved for cases of particularly high culpability or particular gravity. Earlier sentencing authorities pre-dating the 2003 Act no longer provided guidance on that issue. The approach in R v Porter [2007] 1 Cr App R(S) 115 supported the conclusion that the statutory seriousness threshold was not met.
4. This was an unpremeditated killing by one intoxicated person of another. The appellant’s responsibility was diminished, and she had been legally provoked. Those features prevented the offence from being sufficiently grave to justify life imprisonment.
5. For the minimum term, the court treated the offence as manslaughter involving a substantial degree of provocation over a short period. The appropriate determinate sentence after trial was about eight years. A one-quarter reduction for the guilty plea was appropriate because, although the plea was delayed until psychiatric evidence was available, the case had nonetheless been prepared for trial and caused delay for the victim’s family and the court. The resulting determinate term was about six years and the proper minimum term was three years.
6. The substituted sentence remained indefinite. Release depended on the Parole Board being satisfied that the appellant no longer presented a risk to the public.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2008] EWCA Crim 819, allowed the sentence appeal to the stated extent, substituted imprisonment for public protection, and reduced the minimum term.
• Central Criminal Court: On 4 December 2007, imposed life imprisonment for manslaughter and specified a minimum term of four years and six months, less time spent on remand.