Nevers, R. v

A qualified identification may be admissible and probative even though the witness does not make a positive identification. Its use depends on its relationship to other evidence, the explanation for its qualified nature, and safeguards against unfair prejudice. A trial judge has a broad discretion whether an incident during evidence requires the jury to be discharged. A discretionary life sentence is reserved for offending of particular gravity or culpability, ordinarily involving a denunciatory element. Where an offender presents a significant risk of serious harm from further serious offending, imprisonment for public protection may be the appropriate indeterminate sentence.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook of nine robberies committed against women in the Hampstead area. The prosecution relied on similarities between the offences, one positive identification, qualified identifications, and other supporting evidence.

He sought leave, out of time, to appeal his convictions. He challenged the admission and treatment of qualified identifications, the refusal to discharge the jury after a courtroom incident, disclosure relating to an alleged police informant, and numerous allegations of conspiracy and police corruption. He also appealed his life sentences, contending that imprisonment for public protection was the proper indeterminate sentence.

1. Conviction. The court refused to extend time or grant leave to appeal the convictions. The judge had correctly allowed the jury to consider the qualified identifications, subject to careful directions. Applying R v George [2002] EWCA Crim 1923, a qualified identification can be relevant and probative despite the absence of a positive identification. Here, the jury could use it only if sure that the relevant robberies had been committed by the same person, and were warned not to attach undue weight to it.
2. The refusal to discharge the jury after the appellant's remark during the evidence of the only positive identifying witness was a proper exercise of discretion. The judge addressed the incident through an agreed written explanation and later direction. The appellant's own repeated remarks in the jury's hearing did not establish jury bias or unfairness.
3. The alleged antecedents of the supposed informant were irrelevant. The prosecution had adduced evidence that there was no informant and had explained how suspicion came to focus on the appellant. His further allegations of conspiracy, manipulation and alternative offenders either repeated matters resolved by the jury or supplied no arguable basis for challenging the safety of the convictions.
4. Sentence. The appeal against sentence was allowed. The life sentences were quashed because, notwithstanding the seriousness of this campaign of robberies, life imprisonment is reserved for cases of particularly high culpability or particular gravity, normally requiring a denunciatory element. That conclusion followed the approach in Kehoe [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 9 and Wilkinson.
5. The court retained the judge's notional determinate starting point and the minimum term of five years and 170 days. Applying the dangerousness regime in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the appellant presented a significant risk of serious harm from further similar serious offences. An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection was therefore necessary, even without reliance on the statutory presumption. An IPP sentence with that minimum term was imposed on each count.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In R v Nevers [2010] EWCA Crim 1363, the court refused the renewed application for an extension of time and leave to appeal conviction. It allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the life sentences, and substituted imprisonment for public protection with the same minimum term.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook. The appellant was convicted on 10 December 2007 of nine robberies. On 29 February 2008 he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count, with a minimum term of five years and 170 days.