Jessop v R

A summing-up must be assessed fairly and as a whole. Where the jury has received correct general directions on adverse inferences from silence and on the caution required when assessing inconsistent or self-interested evidence, the judge need not repeat those directions whenever later summarising particular evidence.

A judge may remind the jury that a witness does not fall within a category requiring a special warning, provided that the distinction is accurate and does not improperly elevate that witness's evidence. The overriding question is whether any alleged omission or infelicity could make the conviction unsafe.

Jessop v R was an appeal against a conviction at Sheffield Crown Court on 8 April 2009 for violent disorder. The appellant had been tried with six others on counts of murder and violent disorder. At the close of the prosecution case, the judge upheld a submission of no case to answer on murder; the appellant was convicted of violent disorder and received a 10-month detention and training order.

The appeal advanced five complaints about the summing-up. They concerned adverse inferences from the appellant's silence, the treatment of changed evidence from Adam Jackson, the description of Gemma Reece's evidence, and the treatment of evidence given by a co-accused, Seaon Thompson. The central issue was whether those matters rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court found no ground for regarding the conviction for violent disorder as unsafe.

2. The judge had given correct general directions on adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to give evidence. The jury was told that it could draw such an inference only if the prosecution case clearly called for an answer and the only sensible explanation for silence was the absence of an answer capable of bearing examination. The judge also reminded the jury of counsel's suggestion that the appellant might have remained silent because he did not wish to implicate co-accused. No further direction was required.

3. The judge's reference to Adam Jackson being in the original chasing group, rather than the attacking group, was immaterial to the count of violent disorder. The material issue was whether the appellant participated in the attack or merely disarmed an attacker. The jury had already received a full direction to examine Jackson's changed account with particular care, including the possibility of mistake or lies and the possibility that none of his evidence could safely be relied upon. The judge was not required to repeat that direction when later summarising the evidence concerning the appellant.

4. It was proper to say that Gemma Reece was not a witness requiring a special warning. Other witnesses had been interviewed as suspects, or in circumstances in which they might fear being treated as suspects, and the jury had been warned of their possible motive to divert blame. The reminder accurately distinguished Reece from that category.

5. The judge had also given an adequate general warning about the risks in using Thompson's evidence against co-accused, including his possible concern to protect himself and the significance of matters not previously told to the police. Fairness did not require the judge to restate every potential weakness whenever identifying evidence that implicated another defendant.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed in Jessop v R, [2010] EWCA Crim 517.
• Sheffield Crown Court: On 8 April 2009, the appellant was convicted of violent disorder before HHJ Goldsack QC and sentenced to a 10-month detention and training order. The murder count was withdrawn from the jury following a successful submission of no case to answer.