Adcock, R v

A sentencing court must sentence on the basis of plea which it is bound to adopt. It must not make findings about culpability, depravity or future risk that contradict that basis. Sentencing for sexual offences requires assessment of culpability and harm and flexible use of the applicable guideline ranges in light of the individual aggravating and mitigating factors. A future-risk assessment should be addressed through the available dangerous-offender or preventive measures, rather than by increasing a determinate sentence without evidential justification. A late guilty plea may nevertheless justify substantial credit where it follows a material change in the prosecution case.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street to three offences of sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice, contrary to section 30(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The pleas followed an amendment to the indictment on the day set for trial.

The sentencing basis stated that the resident had initiated the physical contact and encouraged its continuation. A judge had indicated that the factual issue could not be resolved at a Newton hearing and that sentence would therefore proceed on that basis. A different judge later imposed concurrent sentences of four years, four years and 18 months' imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the length of the custodial sentences and the sentencing judge's treatment of the agreed basis of plea and future risk.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The court quashed the three custodial sentences and substituted sentences of three years, three years and 15 months respectively.
2. The sentence had to reflect the basis of plea. That basis supported the submission that this was a case of ostensible consent, in which criminality arose from the appellant's lack of judgment in acquiescing in the requests of a person unable to choose whether to engage in a sexual relationship. The sentencing judge's findings that the appellant could not regard the victim as leading him on, and that the offending involved significant depravity, conflicted with that basis and with the earlier indication that sentence would proceed upon it.
3. The court applied section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: seriousness depended principally on culpability and harm. It also recognised that the relevant sentencing guideline allowed flexibility and movement within or between ranges according to the circumstances and the aggravating and mitigating factors. Although the offending remained grave, the agreed basis, absence of planning, and absence of evidence of resulting mental or physical harm justified a departure from the relevant guideline range. The appropriate sentence after a trial would have been four years' imprisonment.
4. The conclusion that the appellant posed a significant or high future risk to vulnerable women was unsupported by the evidence. If such a conclusion were justified, the dangerous-offender provisions should have been considered. Any risk of reoffending could instead have been addressed, if appropriate, by a sexual offences prevention order.
5. A 25 per cent reduction was appropriate for the guilty pleas. Although entered when the case was listed for trial, they followed the prosecution's abandonment of its non-consensual case and amendment of the indictment. The appeal was allowed only by the substituted sentences.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2010] EWCA Crim 700, allowed the sentence appeal to the extent of quashing the sentences and substituting shorter terms.
• Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street: The appellant pleaded guilty on 28 September 2009 after amendment of the indictment. On 20 November 2009, he received concurrent terms of four years, four years and 18 months' imprisonment.