Sheikh, R. v

In fixing a period of director disqualification following serious criminal conduct, the court should assess the case within the established bands of seriousness. A period exceeding 10 years is reserved for particularly serious cases. A period of five to 10 years is appropriate for serious cases that do not merit that highest band.

Sustained and sophisticated corporate dishonesty, substantial illicit gain, an international element, exploitation of vulnerable people, and lack of remorse may justify a period at the top of the middle band. An appellate court should not lightly interfere where the sentencing judge has made no error and has had a detailed view of the offending.

Following a 10-week trial at Southwark Crown Court, the two applicants were convicted in July 2009 of conspiracies concerning copyright and trade-mark offending and of conspiracy to acquire criminal property. They were each sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on 28 July 2009 and disqualified from acting as company directors for 10 years under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.

They made renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence, confined to the length of the disqualification orders. One applicant also required an extension of time. The central issue was whether 10 years, at the top of the middle disqualification band identified in R v Millard (1994) 15 Cr App R(S) 445, was manifestly excessive.

1. The renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence were dismissed. The application for an extension of time was also dismissed because the proposed challenge lacked merit.

2. The court applied the three bands of director disqualification identified in R v Millard (1994) 15 Cr App R(S) 445. Periods of more than 10 years are for particularly serious cases. Periods of two to five years are for relatively less serious cases in which disqualification is mandatory. The middle band, of five to 10 years, is for serious cases not meriting the highest band.

3. The sentencing judge was entitled to place this offending at the top of the middle band. The company had quickly become the vehicle for prolonged and sophisticated dishonesty. The applicants directed the operation, which produced very substantial illicit gains, crossed international boundaries, and involved the exploitation of vulnerable people. The offending stopped only on detection.

4. The applicants’ youth, previous good character and business ability did not make the period excessive. They had contested the case, showed no remorse or regret, and had used their abilities in a wholly dishonest enterprise. The trial judge had observed the defendants and assessed the case throughout a lengthy trial. There was no sentencing error warranting appellate intervention.

5. No order for costs was made.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed applications for leave to appeal against the 10-year director-disqualification orders were dismissed: [2010] EWCA Crim 921.
• Southwark Crown Court: in July 2009 the applicants were convicted after trial and, on 28 July 2009, each received six years’ imprisonment and a 10-year disqualification order under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.