Patel & Ors v R.

An omission from a good-character direction does not render a conviction unsafe where the appellate court is satisfied that a proper direction could not have affected the verdict. The admissibility of a telephone call depends on its contents or surrounding circumstances, rather than the fact of the call alone.

Duress of circumstances is confined to cases of imminent danger which prevents lawful action. Fear based on a person’s reputation, without an imminent threat overcoming the defendant’s ability to act lawfully, does not require the defence to be left to the jury. A sentence must not be reduced to avoid an offender’s liability to deportation.

Four defendants appealed from convictions and sentences imposed at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook for offences arising from planned and completed armed robberies, related conspiracies, and possession of a prohibited firearm and ammunition.

Patel challenged the adequacy of the good-character direction and the admission of telephone evidence. Drakou challenged the admission of bad-character evidence. Eldow contended that duress of circumstances should have been left to the jury. Each also pursued, or sought leave to pursue, a sentencing challenge. Levy sought a reduced minimum term by comparison with his co-offender.

The central issues were whether the convictions were unsafe because of the challenged directions or evidential rulings, and whether any sentence was excessive.

1. Conviction challenges. The court dismissed Patel’s and Eldow’s conviction appeals and refused Patel’s and Drakou’s renewed applications for leave. Patel was entitled to both limbs of a good-character direction, including the credibility limb in relation to her interview account. The omission of that limb was nevertheless inconsequential. The judge had emphasised the interview, the prosecution case was strong, and the court was satisfied that a proper direction would inevitably have produced the same verdict.

2. The telephone call from Patel’s home number was properly admitted. A telephone call is not prejudicial merely because it occurred. Its surrounding circumstances could, however, support an inference of criminal purpose. On the evidence, and absent an innocent explanation from Patel, the jury could draw that inference.

3. Drakou’s bad-character evidence was properly admitted. The case against him was strong. His previous armed-robbery convictions were relevant both to propensity and to his assertion that his contacts with Levy were innocent. The trial judge’s assessment could not be impugned.

4. Duress. The judge correctly withheld duress of circumstances from the jury in Eldow’s case. The defence is narrow and requires imminent danger which prevents lawful conduct. Eldow’s evidence showed that he accepted and concealed the bag voluntarily; it did not disclose an imminent threat that prevented him from contacting the police or refusing to hide it.

5. Sentence. Patel’s sentence was excessive relative to her role, good character, and personal circumstances. Her terms were ordered to run concurrently, reducing the total to seven years less time on remand. Drakou’s withdrawal before the robbery and his lesser role justified reducing his IPP minimum term to five years less time on remand. Levy’s renewed application was refused, since his offending was among the most serious armed robberies and the trial judge was best placed to assess relative culpability. Eldow’s sentence was upheld. Liability to deportation is irrelevant to sentencing and cannot justify a reduction intended to avoid deportation.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2010] EWCA Crim 976, the court dismissed the conviction appeals, refused the renewed conviction applications, reduced Patel’s total sentence and Drakou’s IPP minimum term, and dismissed or refused the remaining sentencing challenges.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook — before HHJ Birts QC, the appellants were convicted on 11 and 12 December 2008 and sentenced on 30 January 2009.