Duggan v Coroner for Northern District of Greater London

Under section 13 of the Coroner's Act 1998, the High Court may quash an inquisition and order another inquest where this is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. The court should focus on whether a fresh inquest might produce a different verdict. It should also consider shortcomings in the original inquest and whether new evidence requires investigation. A fresh inquest may be ordered even where the original verdict might probably be repeated. It is sufficient that the fresh evidence could alter the verdict or that justice requires its careful examination. The court should not determine the eventual outcome of the fresh inquest.

The claimant, the mother of Jeremiah Duggan, applied with the Attorney General’s authority under section 13 of the Coroner's Act 1998. She sought to quash the 2003 inquisition into her son’s death and obtain a fresh inquest before another coroner.

New forensic and witness evidence challenged the original conclusion that Mr Duggan had run into a road and been struck by two cars. It raised issues concerning causation, whether a vehicle had struck him, and possible foul play. The central question was whether another inquest was necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

1. The court held that section 13 of the Coroner's Act 1998 required it to decide whether another inquest was necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. The statutory power included quashing the existing inquisition and ordering an inquest before a coroner for another district in the same administrative area.

2. Following the approach identified in R (Sutovic) v HM Coroner for Northern District of Greater London [2006] EWHC 1095 Admin, the court focused on the possibility, rather than probability, that a fresh inquest might produce a different verdict. Relevant considerations included shortcomings in the original inquest and the need to investigate new evidence that had not previously been examined. A fresh inquest could be ordered even where there was a high probability that the verdict would remain unchanged.

3. The court also considered the principle illustrated by Re Rapier [1988] 1 QB 26, that the interests of justice include the risk that, without a fresh inquest, justice might not have been done and seen to be done.

4. The new forensic reports and witness material could alter the verdict. They raised substantial questions about causation, whether Mr Duggan had been struck by either vehicle, and possible foul play. It was in the interests of justice that this evidence should be carefully considered and analysed at a fresh inquest. The court did not express any view on the eventual verdict.

5. The existing inquisition was quashed and a fresh inquest was ordered before a different coroner. The court made no order as to costs.

The judgment records that the Attorney General initially refused authority for the application. Permission was granted for judicial review of that refusal, after which the Attorney General issued her authority before the substantive judicial review hearing.