Attorney General v Coroner of South Yorkshire (West) & Anor

Under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988, the controlling question is whether another inquest is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. Fresh evidence which may reasonably show that the first inquest failed to reveal the substantial truth about a death will normally satisfy both requirements.

A different verdict need not be anticipated. A further inquest may be desirable even where new evidence could confirm the earlier verdict, particularly where public disclosure of the full evidence serves the interests of the bereaved and the wider community. Defects in the original process are material where they diverted justice or made the inquiry insufficient.

The Attorney General applied under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 to quash the inquisitions into the deaths of the 96 victims of the Hillsborough disaster and to obtain fresh inquests. The original inquests returned verdicts of accidental death. They excluded events after 3.15 pm on the premise that every victim's death was inevitable by then.

The Hillsborough Independent Panel subsequently reviewed extensive material and produced evidence challenging that premise. The new material also concerned the response of the emergency services, alcohol evidence, alterations to official statements and the safety of the stadium. The central issue was whether this evidence made further inquests necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

1. The application was granted. All the inquisitions were quashed and new inquests were ordered in every case.

2. Section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 asks whether another inquest is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. Fresh evidence which may reasonably suggest that the first inquest failed to reveal the substantial truth about how a person died will normally make a further inquest both necessary and desirable. An anticipated change of verdict is not a precondition. Even evidence tending to confirm the earlier verdict may justify a further inquest where its full public disclosure serves the interests of justice.

3. The new pathological evidence was sufficient by itself to justify quashing the inquisitions. It undermined the premise that every death was irreversible by 3.15 pm. It raised credible questions about whether some victims survived beyond that time, whether effective rescue and treatment might have saved them, and whether acts or omissions in the rescue operation contributed to any deaths. The cut-off had prevented all such matters from being investigated.

4. Further matters reinforced that conclusion. The prominence given to alcohol evidence might have affected the assessment of police culpability. The alteration of police and emergency-service statements might bear on whether evidence of neglect or breach of duty relevant to the causes of death had been concealed. Newly highlighted concerns about stadium safety also merited close consideration.

5. The new coroner would determine the evidence, format and scope of the proceedings, including whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights was engaged. The proceedings would remain a coronial process conducted in public, not a public inquiry, and should not become the adversarial contest which had scarred the original inquests.

6. The inquests into the 95 original deaths were remitted to a coroner for the South Yorkshire (East) area at Doncaster. The inquest into Anthony Bland's death was remitted to the West Yorkshire (West) Coroner at Bradford. An assistant deputy coroner was to be appointed and the new inquests were to proceed without unnecessary delay.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On the Attorney General's statutory application, the court quashed all 96 inquisitions and ordered new inquests.

• Earlier proceedings: The original inquests returned verdicts of accidental death. Subsequent inquiries and judicial proceedings seeking to overturn or question those verdicts were unsuccessful, but their individual outcomes and citations are not stated in this judgment.