Rot, R (on the application of) v District Court of Lublin, Poland

In extradition proceedings, suicide risk and other Convention risks must be assessed according to the stage at which the risk arises. Before surrender, the United Kingdom may discharge its obligations through effective protective measures; it need not refuse extradition merely because a person presents a suicide risk. After surrender to a category 1 Convention state, the management of psychiatric illness and protection from fellow prisoners ordinarily fall to the requesting state. A District Judge is generally not required to examine that state’s prison conditions or psychiatric provision, save in exceptional circumstances such as the overthrow of its constitutional order. For oppression under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, a serious and sufficiently established risk is required. A past unsuccessful attempt and a lesser, uncertain risk do not satisfy the test.

The claimant, a Polish national convicted and sentenced in Poland, challenged District Judge Evans’s order for his extradition under a European Arrest Warrant. He relied on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, section 21(2) of the Extradition Act 2003, and oppression arising from his medical condition under section 25(2).

He asserted that he had previously been mistreated in Polish custody and feared suicide if returned. Medical evidence recorded depression, diabetes and attempted suicides in the United Kingdom. The District Judge rejected the factual foundation of the alleged risk, found no real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment, and held that extradition would not be oppressive. The central issues were whether those factual findings were clearly wrong, whether conditions and psychiatric care in Poland had to be examined, and whether the suicide risk met section 25.

1. Appeal dismissed. The High Court would not interfere with the District Judge’s factual findings unless they were clearly wrong. The findings were supported by the implausibility of the account, the claimant’s manner of giving evidence and inconsistencies with the Judicial Authority’s letter. The factual basis for the claimed suicide risk in Poland had therefore been rejected.
2. Convention risks in an extradition case should be considered in two stages. Before surrender, the claimant remains the responsibility of the United Kingdom. That responsibility can in principle be met by protective measures such as close observation and restricting access to ligatures and ligature points. It is unnecessary to refuse extradition and discharge a person solely to avoid a breach of Articles 2, 3 or 8 during that period.
3. After surrender, management of psychiatric illness and protection from fellow prisoners are ordinarily matters for the requesting category 1 Convention state. Drawing on KRS v United Kingdom (Application No. 32733/08) and the mutual assumptions underlying the European Arrest Warrant system, the court held that a District Judge need not examine the requesting state’s prison conditions or psychiatric management, unless its constitutional order has been overthrown, for example by military coup or violent revolution. Evidence on those matters would ordinarily be irrelevant and inadmissible for section 21 purposes.
4. The court treated Jansons v Latvia ([2009] EWHC 1845 (Admin)) as continuing authority that suicide risk can be relevant to oppression under section 25. A serious attempt accompanied by uncontradicted evidence that extradition would result in suicide may justify refusal. Anything materially less is insufficient. The claimant’s history and medical evidence showed, at most, a risk of attempted suicide after earlier unsuccessful attempts. The District Judge was therefore unquestionably entitled to conclude that extradition was not oppressive.

The appeal was rejected. A public funding assessment of costs was directed.

The judgment records the order of District Judge Evans dated 30 March 2010, directing extradition after a hearing. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the substance of that decision.