W v A Spanish Judicial Authority

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, physical or mental illness bars extradition only where, having regard to all the circumstances, return would be unjust or oppressive. The threshold is high. The court must assess the medical evidence in the round, including the likely effect of extradition, the risk of suicide, available treatment and the requesting state’s procedures.

Mutual trust ordinarily permits the court to assume that a requesting state will provide appropriate medical treatment and a fair process. Specific assurances require clear, cogent and updated evidence of an exceptional condition or a real risk of Convention-rights violations. Article 8 may exceptionally bar extradition, but the weighty public interest in honouring extradition obligations normally prevails.

The appellant appealed against an extradition order made by District Judge Blake under an accusation European Arrest Warrant issued by a Spanish judicial authority. She relied on section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, arguing that her mental condition made extradition unjust or oppressive. She also renewed permission to appeal on an Article 8 ground under section 21A.

The appellant had depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and a history of psychotic symptoms and benzodiazepine dependence. She argued that extradition would cause serious deterioration, create a suicide risk, impair her fitness to plead, deny adequate treatment and prevent meaningful participation in pending care proceedings concerning her daughter. The central issues were whether either statutory ground barred extradition and whether extradition should be postponed until the care proceedings concluded.

1. Outcome. The appeal under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 failed. Permission to appeal on Article 8 was granted, but that appeal was dismissed. The extradition order remained in force, subject to an agreed extension of time until after the conclusion of the care proceedings.
2. Applicable approach. The court had to make its own assessment on all the evidence, including fresh medical evidence and developments in the care proceedings. The section 25 test encompasses unfairness arising from ill health, but ordinary stress, hardship, inferior treatment abroad and the fact that treatment may be less beneficial than in the United Kingdom are insufficient. The statutory test must be applied in the context of the very weighty public interest in fulfilling extradition obligations.
3. Fitness to plead. Fitness to plead was ordinarily for the requesting court to determine through a fair process. It would not generally be unjust to extradite a person to face such a determination. The evidence showed that Spanish proceedings would permit medical assessment and consideration of fitness, and mutual trust required the court to assume that Spain would act compatibly with fundamental rights.
4. Mental health and suicide. The appellant’s conditions were serious but not unusually complex. Her evidence did not establish a substantial risk that she would successfully commit suicide whatever protective measures were taken. Appropriate diagnosis, treatment and monitoring could be expected in Spain. The likely adverse effect of imprisonment and separation from her daughter carried weight, but did not reach the statutory threshold.
5. Mutual trust and assurances. Specific assurances were unnecessary. The evidence of Spanish prison healthcare, including psychiatric assessment, treatment programmes and hospital referral, was sufficient. Generalised or sporadic criticism of prison healthcare did not amount to the clear, objective, reliable, specific and updated evidence required to rebut mutual trust.
6. Article 8 and other matters. The possible availability of prosecution in England added no significant weight because section 19B did not apply and Parliament had defined when forum considerations could bar extradition. The domestic-violence background was relevant but added no significant weight on these facts. Differences between Spanish and English special-measures procedures did not establish that the Spanish process was unjust.
7. Postponement. The appellant’s participation in the forthcoming care hearing was of considerable importance. The court could not itself postpone extradition under sections 27 and 36, but the respondent agreed to extend the extradition period. Extradition was therefore postponed until after the care proceedings, then scheduled for November 2020, concluded.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Blake ordered extradition on 29 April 2019. The Divisional Court dismissed the section 25 and Article 8 appeals, while granting permission on the Article 8 ground. The extradition period was extended by agreement until after the conclusion of the care proceedings.